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Steens Mountain is located in the southeast comer o f the Oregon High Desert, at the
northern edge o f the Great Basin. The mountain is a place o f exceptional ecological
diversity—a “sky island” that is home to rare, endangered, and endemic flora and fauna
as well as approximately 18,000 head o f cattle and thirty-five ranchers. Recently
designated as the Steens Mountain Cooperative Management and Protection Area, it
stands in contrast to the many national monuments declared by former President Clinton
during the last years o f his presidency.
In August 1999, former Interior Secretary Bmce Babbitt visited Steens Mountain to
settle the long-standing question o f special designation. Instead o f calling for
administrative protection, Babbitt indicated that he would support legislation that would
protect the mountain, designated through congressional action and local involvement.
However, Secretary Babbitt also stated that if the legislative effort proved unsuccessful,
he would recommend national monument designation through an executive order. This
explicit threat set the wheels in motion for collaboration and intense negotiations between
locals, environmentalists, state and federal government officials, and ranchers. It
ultimately resulted in a legislative solution that many see as a new model for solving land
management conflicts in the West.
This is the first agreement o f its kind. The results include the first legislated cattle-free
wilderness area; land exchanges that help consolidate and protect the fragile, alpine areas
on the mountain; the maintenance o f economically viable ranches in the low country; and
the establishment o f a diverse citizens’ advisory committee that will assist the BLM in
managing the mountain—among other precedent-setting acts.
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I
Mountain Lure
More than any other American place I know, this desert comer bespeaks change, the
subtle changes sometimes a mask for grand upheavals.
-W illiam Least Heat Moon, “Oregon’s Outback”

A deep autumn chill accompanied the fading light. I sat within the screened
porch o f the ranch bunkhouse, a well-used, worn building— its white paint chipped and
peeling to reveal a weathered gray. Though I had stripped to a tank top while hiking only
hours earlier that day, thin triangles o f ice began to coalesce in the dog’s water bowl.
Unworried mule deer grazed within my touch. They gathered on the refuge for safety
during the hunting season. Their oversized ears flicked back and forth at the sounds of
night settling— a barn owl, coyote, or distant diesel truck kicking up gravel on a solitary
desert road.
In an hour, I would sleep in this little bunkhouse at the southern end o f the
Malheur National Wildlife Refuge. My hosts, Alice and Cal Elshoff, were caretakers o f
the recently acquired property, a ranch they had lobbied for and helped procure the funds
for the refuge to purchase. They graciously offered me the building during my week of
research. A wood stove was welcome warmth; the night before I had slept cocooned in a
down sleeping bag in the back o f my truck while the temperature hovered in the teens.
I had returned to this desert comer in southeastern Oregon in early October o f
2000 to research the ongoing political changes at Steens Mountain—changes that evolved
almost too quickly for me to track them. They would ultimately result in unique
legislation passed by the House o f Representatives on October 4th o f 2000, the Senate on
October 12th, and signed into law by President Clinton on October 30th. The bill was
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bom o f bipartisan cooperation as well as the involvement o f local ranchers and
environmentalists. It designates the 425,550-acre Steens Mountain Cooperative
Management and Protection Area; involves ecologically and economically important land
trades between ranchers and the federal government; establishes the first legislatively
created cattle-free wilderness area; promotes a cooperative grazing agreement with
ranchers; and a creates a reserve for the endemic redband trout— among other precedentsetting acts. But, on that deepening October night, as I prepared to sleep on the marshy
wildlife refuge that lay below the mountain, I had no idea if H.R. 4828, at that time under
consideration in the House, would be severely altered, stalled, or killed. I had no idea if
Interior Secretary Bruce Babbitt would fulfill his threat and Steens Mountain would
instead become a national monument through executive action.
The sun slipped away under a volcanic bluff, and the stars began feasting on a
plum-wine sky. The subtle, slow changes required patient observation. Despite the cold,
I lingered on the porch awhile longer. Almost a year earlier, I had read about the conflict
at Steens while trying to calm my nerves on a flight to Chicago. As the plane accelerated
down the runway, I focused upon the unknown fate o f this virtually unknown mountain
in my home state. Back on the ground, my curiosity held, and soon thereafter I began
combing the newspapers and looking for more information on Steens Mountain.
Though I had previously visited the area in early March, the evening closed my
first full snow-free day on the mountain. That morning, I decided to settle into the
landscape rather than jump headfirst into a series of complex interviews with ranchers,
environmentalists, and BLM staff. Alice Elshoff greeted me in her kitchen with coffee
and muffins. A trim, athletic woman with a warm voice and bright eyes, she wore a

2

Great Old Broads for Wilderness T-shirt. Her face was etched by the wind and sun o f the
desert, where she had spent much o f her life exploring. But aside from a mix o f gray in
her dark hair, she did not betray her sixty-six years. Elshoff had plans to plant
cottonwood and willow along an irrigation ditch on the refuge— improve it as habitat for
redband trout. She had gathered together a few Forest Service scientists to look at
different sites on Mud Creek, where she and a group o f volunteers might cut and clone
the species. I came along for the ride and exercise.
We drove up the North Loop road, climbing the broad western side o f the
mountain, a gentle slope o f uplifted earth tilted towards a 9,700-foot summit. The sky
was a polished slate o f blue on the absolutely cloudless morning. The land rolled in burnt
summer grasses and sage and rabbitbrusfr—the desert colors. But, above us, flowing out
o f gullies and-spilling across the desert were the aspen. Some had already shed their
leaves and streaked the landscape with gray—edged by the shaipness o f their white,
slender trunks. Others resembled a finger painting with smudges o f deep golden, fiery
orange, and light tinges o f neon green as the leaves held onto late summer. They seemed
an anomaly, such vibrant breaths in the high desert. We all fell silent watching the trees
blur as we gained elevation and then accidentally sped past the unmarked two-track
where we were supposed to hike down to an ephemeral tributary o f Mud Creek. “Sorry,”
Elshoff explained to the driver, “I was gawking at the aspens.”
Walking through such aspen glens in the fall is nothing but sensual. The soft light
casting through the branches is seductive, and you can feel it comb through your hair and
blow against the back of your neck. Deer bed down here, leaving their warm imprints in
the dim grasses. Hawk nests adorn the crowns. Leaves twist and tremble on a light
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desert wind. Generations o f lovers have come here, carved initials and symbols in the
milky trunks. The carvings scab with age and climb up the trunk as the trees grow—
some are now too high to read. Some are simply unreadable, left from lonely Basque
sheepherders who roamed the mountain with their herds at the beginning o f the century.
It seems odd, in such an open landscape, where the sky dominates every view, to
be ducking and tripping, stepping aside for branches and weaving through a maze of
bone-like trunks. The transition is sudden from the desert to the wet meadows and
trees—as sudden as the cool air that latches onto you when you step out o f the burning
sun and into the aspens clustering around springs or cottonwoods lining the mountain
creeks. Part o f it has to do with the ecological diversity that comes with elevation change
as the mountain catches rain clouds and holds snow almost year-round. Steens
Mountain’s complex story stretches across a geologic timeline—volcanism, plate
tectonics, uplift, and climate change. And though human habitation here is relatively
recent in comparison, part o f that ecological and geologic transition is also wrapped in
our own species’ stories. Those aspen glades, meadows, and mountain gorges drew early
white settlers, cattlemen, and sheepherders, and sustained the Northern Paiutes for
thousands o f years beforehand.
A specific human story drew me to Steens, and, like many, the story arises from
and is fought over a specific landscape. One simply might call it the classical cowboy
versus environmentalist battle, but, in this case, it’s not that simple. All o f the players
lined up for the fight, and though they hardly remain allies today, they’ve each walked
away from the table somewhat satisfied as a result o f their negotiations and compromises.
Politics, rhetoric, name-calling, and distrust were not left out o f the story. A month after
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my fall visit to the Steens, after the bill had been signed by President Clinton, Andy Kerr,
perhaps Oregon’s most famous environmentalist, bluntly explained that conservationists
were able to win prizes such as 97,000 acres o f cattle-free wilderness because “we simply
had more guns to their head.” But others, including politicians and their staffs, have
touted the bill as an example o f cooperation, collaboration, and trust-—a precedent-setting
model for natural resources conflicts. I eventually discovered that the deal had elements
o f trust and distrust as well as moments o f shrewd negotiation and an occasional
enjoyable truce— such as when a couple o f environmentalists and ranchers leaned against
a truck in the Catlow Valley and drank a few beers at the end o f their bargaining day.
People talked to me for hours in the Great Basin. Everyone from BLM staff to
“old family” ranchers to environmentalists would show me a natural hospitality, one that
you perhaps cannot live without in such an empty place. They took time to tell me their
stories, feed me, house me, and show me where to go on the mountain. And from them,
as well as from those I talked to in Oregon’s metropolitan areas, I learned about the
importance o f the mountain, the specific people involved, the political process, and the
drama o f negotiation.

From the bunkhouse porch, I could no longer see the distinct silhouette o f the
Steens, stretched long and wide. I could only imagine its high, glacial gorges and its
desert to the east, a creamy, barren playa, called the Alvord. I had not yet seen the
mountain’s summit. Night’s transformation was complete, and then I could only listen.
In Blue Highways, William Least Heat Moon writes, “the desert does its best talking at
night” (Least Heat Moon 1982). So I lingered.

5

n

Basin and Range
Taut is the word that fits this country. The elasticity o f the earth’s crust seems palpable,
the surface pulled tight until it gives way to the parallel fault blocks that create the bowls
o f the basins and the ridges o f the ranges.
-Stephen Trimble, The Sagebrush Ocean: A Natural History o f the Great Basin.

Drive fifteen miles southeast o f Bend, Oregon, on Highway 20 and you’ll find
yourself lost in the Oregon High Desert. Glance in the rearview mirror and 10,000-foot
volcanoes cloaked by glaciers fade into distance. Look ahead and there will be nothing
but a long stretch o f highway, edged by telephone poles and makeshift fence posts,
pushing through empty basins o f sage and rabbitbrush and bunch grasses. This is the
northern comer o f the Great Basin. Snow-dusted plateaus and gentle mountains rest on
all horizons.
At the town o f Bums, head south on Highway 205 towards Malheur National
Wildlife Refuge. When you crest over a dry, rocky plateau, Malheur Lake will spread
below you as if a part o f the sky has fallen upon the desert. Other ponds, lakes, and
marshes are barely visible in the expanse. Only the light caught from the air
distinguishes the water from the rich muddy tones o f the desert below. It looks like an
impressionistic painting, as if the artist deliberately blurred the delineation o f land,
mountains, clouds, sky.
Steens rises above the Blitzen River Valley, where cattle graze with sandhill
cranes in fenced pastures. This fault-block mountain reaches 9,700 feet above sea level.
It stretches north and south for almost sixty miles—from Riddle Mountain to Alvord
Peak and Long Hollow— and east and west— from the Alvord Desert to the Blitzen and
Catlow Valleys— for another forty. Viewed from the east, the Steens escarpment pushes
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5,500 feet out o f the Alvord Desert in less than three miles. On the west side, the valley
bottoms are lost to sage and rangeland, or plowed into neat squares. The land slopes up
gently towards broad plateaus, which darken with juniper and mountain mahogany.
Below one o f these rises might rest a cluster o f small buildings: a house, a bam, a tinroofed shed covering hay bales. The buildings are centered in geometric fields, twenty or
forty miles apart from the next cluster.
The mountain belongs to the Northern Basin and Range province, and, as such, it
is related more closely to the eco-regions found in Nevada than in western Oregon.
According to the Bureau o f Land Management’s Steens Mountain Resources handbook,
this geomorphic province contains a series o f nearly parallel, generally north-trending,
fault block mountains separated by broad valleys (BLM 1999). The area is bounded by
the Sierra Nevada on the west, the Rocky Mountains and Colorado River drainage on the
east, the Snake River Plain on the north, and pierces the Salton Trough o f northern Baja
California at its southern tip. Though the region is given different hydrographic,
physiographic, historic, and biogeographic definitions, perhaps the easiest way to define
the Great Basin is, as Stephen Trimble does in The Sagebrush Ocean: “the piece o f the
West that drains inward” (Trimble 1989). Each creek that flows from a mountain leads to
a closed basin; some collect in low-lying marshes or lakes. Most drainage areas descend
to vast alkali playas, ephemeral lakes, and desert. There is no outlet to the sea.
Yet the basin and range topography rises and falls like waves rolling onto a beach.
Basin and range. Basin and range. One after another. “Mountain ranges alternate with
desert basins in lilting rhythm. Their magnitudes are equal,” writes Trimble. “One to
one, basin to range.”
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The basin and range faulting that produced Steens began approximately eighteen
million years ago during the Miocene period—characterized by regional, east to west
arching and stretching of the earth’s crusts, which still continues today. At about sixteen
million years ago, faulting was accompanied by large volume volcanic flows o f basaltic
lava, now called Steens basalt. The flows formed an elongated, low shield volcano— a
gently sloping mound constructed by countless fluid basaltic flows that erupted without
explosions. It was centered near the precipitous escarpment rising out o f the Alvord.
Basalt flows extended from Abert Rim, sixty miles to the west, to the Santa Rosa Range
o f Nevada.
You don’t have to be a geologist to recognize that Steens is a result o f uplift.
Stand in the desert and stare long enough at the mountain, and the entire fault block will
appear to heave itself heavenward. Less than a million years ago, uplift o f Steens
Mountain created high enough elevations for the formation o f alpine glaciers. And
between 24,000 and 12,000 years ago, the Alvord Valley was actually a large lake— a
result o f warmer temperatures and increased precipitation that accompanied a climate
change, which occurred several thousand years after the glaciers on Steens peaked. Lake
Alvord began to dry up 11,000 years ago, and the glaciers did likewise, 9,000 years ago.
The Alvord Valley contains a layer o f sediment almost 1,000 feet thick—eroded from the
Steens escarpment (BLM 1999; Brown 2000). That process o f erosion continues, as it
does to other mountains and ridges throughout the region: basins fill and drop as
mountains are pushed up and fall away.
Those two major geologic processes—volcanic eruptions and tectonic faulting
and stretching—together with the warmer Pleistocene climate changes that produced
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glaciation and pluvial lake formation, account for the 5,500-foot escarpment on Steens’
east face, the broad sweep o f the Alvord Valley, as well as hanging valleys and 2,000foot deep glacial gorges on the mountain. The glaciers scraped away the earth and dug
trenches about half-a-mile deep, exposing basalt (Brown 2000; BLM 1999). Steens is
defined by four o f these U-shaped gorges—Kiger, Little Blitzen, Big Indian, and
Wildhorse—which are visible from the west and north sides o f the mountain.

When I visited for my first round o f interviews in early March o f 2000, Stacy
Davies drove me to a viewpoint o f the mountain on the South Loop Road. He looked the
classic cowboy in slim-fitting Wranglers: wiry and taut, clean shaven, with pale blue
eyes. Davies is the ranch manager for Roaring Springs Ranch, the biggest on the
mountain, with (before the enactment o f the legislation and land trades) 146,000 acres o f
private land and 250,000 acres o f BLM leases. Because o f its size and location in the
Catlow Valley, right on Highway 205, Roaring Springs became a focal point in the
politics o f special designation o f the mountain. Everyone—ranchers, BLM staff, even
environmentalists—told me that the owners were lucky to have Stacy Davies.
We stepped out o f his truck when the road became blocked by snow, and he
directed my eyes to the ridgeline.
“Little Indian and Big Indian Gorges come together right at the base o f the
mountain,” he said. “This is Little Blitzen further to the left, and it kind o f curls around
here. And then Kiger Gorge is on the north side. It runs straight north. Wild Horse runs
straight south, and they all come to a point right up there on the high Steens.” I followed
the trace of his hands.
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Davies pointed out the famous notch in the east ridge o f Kiger Gorge. “Clear on
down the skyline, to the left, is Kiger Gorge. You can see the ridge on the opposite side
o f the gorge, and the gunsight, where the mountain goes down like that in the distance.”
The notch or gunsight formed during a later glaciation when a smaller glacier in Mann
Creek Canyon eroded through the ridgetop.
Snow demarcated changes in elevation—a thin layer as it sloped towards the
north, while the western and southern parts o f the mountain were blanketed almost to the
rim we stood on. From this angle, Steens resembled a rectangular plateau more than a
mountain. It looked unfinished, like a block o f wet clay that bore only the first, broad
cuts o f a palette knife—the essential shape, before hours o f detailed sculpting and
smoothing. The clouds mimicked the mountain, shoved up against it and stretched out
long against the flat sky. I thought o f a topographic map and imagined an arc o f line
sweeping out in a lobe from the gorges. We stood within the line, actually on the
mountain itself, about ten miles from the Catlow Rim. But the uplift before us seemed
disjointed, an entirely different piece o f land.
“You have traveled across the West a substantial amount,” Davies said. He
shoved his thumbs in his pockets and shifted his eyes away from the mountain and
towards me. I leaned against his worn diesel truck and nodded yes. “There’s a lot o f
land that looks like this,” he asserted and swept the back o f his hand across the landscape,
pointing out juniper, sagebrush, and rocky desert hills. “There really is,” he continued.
“But that up there,” Davies nodded at the big, snowy hulk, stretched like a wing to the
north. “There’s probably only three places in the world just like that.”
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Steens Mountain did look like an apparition—carving its own space into that o f
the Oregon High Desert. As I stood there with Davies, the mountain loomed as an oasis
o f biodiversity, presiding over Malheur National Wildlife Refuge, an island o f lakes and
marshes, habitat for migratory birds, in a sea o f sunburnt bluffs, plateaus, and sage. I had
to agree.
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Frenchglen
Next in importance to the divine profusion o f water, light, and air, those three physical
facts which render existence possible, may be reckoned the universal
beneficence o f grass. — Senator John J. Ingalls

Harney County is larger than most New England states: 143 miles long and 86.6
miles wide. The population in 1996 was estimated to be 7,500 people. Bums is the
largest town at 2,935 people. Stacey Davies’ six children make up about half o f
Frenchglen School’s students. O f the 3,210 jobs listed in 1996,970 were in the
government sector and 470 were in the farm sector (BLM 1999). These statistics, though
obviously relevant, do not quite paint a picture o f the landscape and how these people fit
into it.
Outside o f Bums, there are no services on Highway 205 for over 70 miles. Visit
in winter or spring, and you won’t see many tourists. You’ll drive through vast basins
filled with lakes in flood, reeds and bunchgrasses, waterbirds, red-winged blackbirds,
cranes, swans, pelicans, and scattered herds o f mule deer. A lone truck might pass on the
highway, and a rancher will raise his index finger from the steering wheel as greeting.
You’ll feel it’s rude not to reciprocate. Further on, you’ll have to slow down for a
cowboy herding steers along the road with his eager cattle dogs. Frenchglen is little more
than a cafe, a general store, and a bend in the highway. The hotel there was built around
1916 as a stopping place for teamsters, who were needed to help the freight teams get up
the hill (now a paved 15% grade) to the Catlow Valley on their way to Winnemucca,
Nevada.
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In 1994, livestock production in Hamey County generated around $22.8 million
in sales. BLM forage (grazing allotments) for beef production accounted for
approximately thirty-five percent o f total forage (BLM 1999).
“The only reason these guys are out there is because livestock were on these lands
prior to laws being enacted—it was open range at the time o f settlement,” Bill Marlett,
executive director o f the Oregon Natural Desert Association (ONDA), asserted during a
conversation in Bend, Oregon. “It’s only by default that they have an institutional
presence on these landscapes. If you were to ask the question today, assuming there was
no grazing on public lands, and say, ‘Well, do we want to start a public lands grazing
program in the West?’—that wouldn’t go anywhere. There’s no way we’d be grazing on
the public lands if the question were asked today for the first time. What we’re dealing
with is an institution that has a lot o f political clout and a lot o f momentum. It’s deeply
ingrained, culturally and politically—not to mention ingrained in the psyche o f the
American public.”
Marlett is probably right. Ranching is built on one o f the most potent myths in
the America: the agrarian myth. And so the question o f whether or not grazing should be
allowed on public lands in the West wasn’t even asked; it simply happened without
questioning, more than a hundred years ago, as white settlers trickled into and “tamed”
the country. Every historical book on Steens Mountain that I picked up celebrated the
culture o f the industrious rancher. Cattle Country o f Pete French, published in 1964, told
me that “Hamey basin today is cattle country supreme.” Its author, Giles French,
explained that had it not been for the early ranching settlers, “the West might still be a
battleground between Indians and whites, with its lands unplowed, its timber decaying,
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its minerals unmined. In the latter part o f this golden age o f the West, the men who won
respect were those who . . . developed the ranches to make use o f the most basic resource
o f all: the soil” (French 1964). Despite what now seems like antiquated viewpoints,
French’s perceptions are only a generation old. And, to some, they still ring true.
Steens Mountain in Oregon's High Desert Country, published in 1967, is
“dedicated to the pioneer cattlemen and sheepmen who settled this country.” It’s
primarily a picture book, portraying the landscape o f the Steens as well as the people who
live there. The photographs are beautiful, though unreal, bathed in those redder than red,
bluer than blue, and traffic light yellow prints o f the time period. There are essays
scattered among the photographs, the subjects ranging from “Horseback Geology” to
“The Marshlands” to “Men on the Mountain” and even “The Worth o f Solitude.” The
men and their cattle are given equal weight with the plants, birds, animals, streams, and
gorges o f Steens. The authors and photographer obviously love the pristine, natural
beauty o f the landscape, but see no conflict between utilizing natural resources and
respecting the graces o f nature. As man stands alone on a mountaintop, writes E.R.
Jackman in a Whitmanesque tone within the last chapter o f the book, “he is the center o f
a wheel o f huge diameter. He is the hub o f a vast, visible universe and if he is important
at all, he is, at the moment, the link between God and all o f these thousands o f square
miles below.” In the first chapter o f the book, the same author stands on a pulpit and
asserts that “from a practical standpoint about three million more stomachs each year in
America demand beef. It can be supplied as efficiently from Hamey County as from any
place in America” (Jackman and ScharfF 1967).
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Within Jackman’s book is a picture o f Deadman Gate. Clouds dominate the
photo, tower above the weathered, gray wood o f the gate, open and leaning o ff its wire
hinges. It is connected to an old stone fence, which runs between two rims along the
west side o f the Blitzen Valley. Sitting on an Appaloosa—one hand resting behind him
on the saddle’s cantle, elbow bent, and the reining hand resting in front o f him on the
saddle’s horn—is Fred Witzel. His fecial features are barely visible, shadowed by a
cowboy hat. A coiled rawhide rope hangs from his saddle. He and horse stand as
sentinel figures against the open sky. The photo caption states that Witzel runs a “fine
herd” o f Hereford cattle, and is an “excellent roper and horseman.” It also says that Fred
Witzel is the son o f John “Ochoco” Witzel, one o f the valley pioneers, who was with Pete
French at Diamond, on June 18,1878, during an Indian attack. Though he was shot
through the hip, “thirty days later, after the loose pieces o f bone had worked out o f his
leg, John Witzel took off with a band o f cattle for Winnemucca, Nevada” (Jackman and
Scharff 1967).
John Ochoco Witzel’s picture can be found in the book Hamey County Oregon,
and Its Range Land. He is standing in a group photo, taken in the 1870s, o f early
pioneers— each o f whom wears a steady, serious look. Witzel is the tallest among them.
He has blond hair, a straight nose, wire rim glasses, and a clean jaw. His great-grandson,
also named John Witzel, more than resembles him.
John and Cindy Witzel run a business called Steens Mountain Packers. Not only
do they guide clients on horse packing and hunting trips, but in the winter, the couple
leads snowmobile tours, snow shoeing, and cross country skiing opportunities. Their
base camp is on the mountain, 320 acres above Fish Lake. We sat at their kitchen table
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one night in March 2000, sipped beer, and tried to talk above the strong voice o f their
loquacious two-year-old son Colton, who competed voraciously to be the center o f
attention.
Witzel’s career began as a cattle rancher, like his father, grandfather, and great
grandfather. Speaking o f the controversial special designation on Steens, Witzel said, “In
1986, the handwriting was on the wall back then that they were going to do this. And I
told my dad, I said, ‘I don’t think there there’s a future here. I’m young enough that I can
change, and I’m going to do something different.’” He quit relying on cattle ranching as
his sole income, but he couldn’t leave the mountain. “My great-granddad came here in
the early 1870s. He homesteaded here, and he worked for Pete French off and on. He
did all kinds o f different things to survive, like we all do. He raised a family here, my
granddad and his siblings, and my granddad and three o f his siblings homesteaded right
across the valley. Then the Fish and Wildlife Service decided they wanted this valley for
the [Malheur National Wildlife] Refuge. What’s happening on Steens right now, to me,
is an exact repeat of then.”
Like all ranchers, the Witzels have had to make adjustments to their operations
and lifestyles as a result o f a changing economics, demographics, and values in the West.
John Witzel’s grandfather had to move the ranch twice, eventually to the Diamond Valley
on the north end o f Steens. Being a neighbor of the federal government wasn’t always
easy. But most ranchers at Steens were successful at their business, through the
ownership o f vast tracts o f land. And almost all o f them felt that they had a right to not
only their own ground but also to a joint stewardship o f the public domain, where their
predecessors had run cattle before there were any rules to abide by, when the public lands
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were free and unregulated. John “Ochoco” Witzel certainly faced hardship, but not the
same wall that his great-grandson described to me.
Pete French, for whom “Ochoco” occasionally buckarooed, was one o f the
most famous cattle barons o f his day. French arrived in the Blitzen Valley in 1872 with
1,200 cows, twenty saddle horses, and six Mexican vaqueros. He was only twenty-three
and saw the oasis o f grass and dependable water flowing from Steens as just the right
ingredients for a cattle operation. French had ridden for two months, a journey which
began in northern California and took him past the Warner Valley, south o f Hart
Mountain, Beatty’s Butte, and finally to Roaring Springs in the Catlow Valley. There a
discouraged prospector sold French his “P” brand and cattle, and with them came his
range: land that stretched up over the Catlow Rim to the Donner und Blitzen River and
across that to the top o f the mountain. With the backing o f Dr. John Glenn, a famous
California wheat grower, French began buying land at once, moving steadily up the
Blitzen Valley towards Malheur Lake. He built one of the largest single cattle ranches in
the United States in less than twenty-eight years: the firm, French-Glenn, owned over
150,000 acres o f land (Brimlow 1951).
French was able to make his start with that failed prospector’s cattle and range
under the then existing rules o f possession: first come, first served. “Usage,” writes Giles
French, “rather than outright ownership o f the land itself, determined the right to control”
(French 1964). The right to control, initiated during settlement, would continue well past
that era and become even more important in the next century o f grazing policy. But it
was bom into western ranching with cattlemen such as French, when the land was free
and there for the taking. French, a few other large landowners, and dozens o f small
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landowners took up much o f the natural meadowland, aspen glens, and creeks by 1878 (a
fact that would prove problematic when the question o f special designation o f Steens
became an issue in the 1990s).
Throughout the West at French’s time, land was acquired by the manipulation o f
the General Homestead Act o f 1862, which allowed a maximum o f only 160 acres—not
nearly enough for a cattle operation in the arid West. Additional parcels were acquired
from other homesteaders or relatives or “dummies,” paid off homesteaders. And though
the deeded land was important as the location o f the base ranch, the acres were small in
comparison with the total amount o f public land— free and unregulated—controlled by
the rancher under an established “home rule” code. In Crossing the Next Meridian,
Charles Wilkinson explains that “range rights,” were “recognized as a matter o f custom
for all land actually grazed within the drainage in which the base ranch was located; it
was not uncommon for range rights to apply to thirty or forty square miles” (Wilkinson
1992).
Wilkinson goes on to describe how a typical ranch o f the time operated, a
description that adequately fits the settlement pattern o f the Steens country. Base ranches
were located on rich bottomlands, alongside creeks and rivers. The surrounding land was
federal domain public land, “and in the spring, summer, and fall, ranchers would turn
loose their stock to graze on tens o f thousands o f acres o f higher land above the base
ranches”— as they still do today (Wilkinson 1992). In this way, a very small number of
ranchers, like Pete French, were able to control entire watersheds—even though perhaps
not all o f the land belonged to them.
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At Steens Mountain, other stockmen from California began crowding in by 1870.
Early settlers took up the swampland and most o f the land that could be irrigated, but left
thousands o f acres o f land owned by the federal government open to homestead entry.
The Enlarged Homestead Act o f 1909—which differed from the 1862 act by allowing
settlers 320 acres—brought out dryland farmers to the mountain, who still, more often
than not, failed and sold their land to the already established ranchers who held water
rights. Most o f the ranches on Steens today were built by adding one homestead after
another, piece by piece (Brimlow 1951).
Before the land exchanges that came with the 2000 legislation on Steens, the
BLM reported that on the north portion o f the mountain, 31 percent or 111,100 acres
were privately held. On the southern end, 58,600 acres or 48 percent o f the mountain
was private. On the central part, 15 percent or 48,200 acres, and on the southeast portion,
14,900 acres or 13 percent o f the mountain was private ground. These 232,700 acres,
comprising 25 percent o f the mountain, were split among 239 landowners. And twentythree permittees controlled 68,675 AUMS on public land (BLM 1999). Steens Mountain,
writes Giles French, “was never a country for the small landowner; it takes a lot o f it for
financial security” (French 1964).
That amount o f private land, consolidated throughout the generations o f ranchers
and, eventually, corporations, proved to be one o f the locals’ best cards at the negotiation
table. Though Secretary Babbitt promised that it wouldn’t affect his threat o f use o f the
Antiquities Act, the ranchers used it as leverage against national monument designation
with their own threats o f fencing it o ff or developing it should Clinton use his
administrative authority.
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The ranchers’ high country land, those fragile, pristine meadows and alpine
gorges, was an important bargaining point for another reason. The environmentalists
wanted the land under public ownership—wanted cows o ff o f it—and were able to
negotiate for it by offering the ranchers economic adjustments and often seven times as
much public land in the desert below. The land trades were one o f the keystones o f the
bill that finally passed Congress. And they wouldn’t have happened, at least not in the
same way, with monument designation.
But it wasn’t just land that established ranchers as the other major player at
Steens; they held a key political card as well. By settling an “unsettled” country and
grazing unregulated land over a hundred years ago, their predecessors established what
they saw as a right to control. And the industry as a whole would attempt to hold onto
that right, most often successfully, throughout changes in grazing policy over the course
o f the next century. Pete French, at age forty-eight, was shot and killed on a sagebrush
flat by an angry and struggling settler, who was resentful o f the land baron—but not
before he established an empire.

Yet, in the end, even French’s empire broke apart. Some years after his death,
part o f his ranch was sold to another livestock company. In 1935, the federal government
bought 65,000 acres o f it to add to the Malheur National Wildlife Refuge (Brimlow
1951). Would French roll over in his grave if he knew that the marshland he reclaimed
for his cattle was restored for migratory birds? Today, the Blitzen Valley is dominated
by the refuge— not one man’s ranch—and this change parallels not only the recent
transformation on Steens but also the transformation o f the rangeland at large. Bit by bit,
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the ranchers’ hegemony over the public lands has eroded. But it has not disappeared.
The fact that ranchers were able to get as much as they did out o f the Steens agreement
proves that they their grip, though perhaps not as tight, is still firm.
Though ranchers never received rights to the range by law, they were left, as
Wilkinson puts it, with an unwritten privilege: their own code “built on manipulation o f
the land disposal laws, physical possession o f the federal range, intimidation, illegal
fencing, and customary recognition o f range rights among themselves” (Wilkinson 1992).
That privilege was not to last uncontested. Attempts at displacing the ranchers’ code
began with the Taylor Grazing Act, which ended the era o f homesteading and brought, as
the following decades would eventually prove, the defacto, unofficial end o f land
disposal. The act also initiated the era o f regulation through grazing fees. Opponents of
the ranchers’ rule pointed to the overgrazing that had occurred since the late 1800s. The
land was beat to hell, and the droughts o f the Dust Bowl and the poverty brought by the
Great Depression didn’t help matters. But those seeking to implement new polices found
out that an unwritten code was often harder to break than one set in stone by law.
The Taylor Grazing Act became law on June 28, 1934. The act authorized the
secretary o f the interior to establish grazing districts and develop any regulations to
administer these districts, including charging fees for use o f the land, granting leases for
up to ten years, pursuing range improvement projects, and establishing cooperative
agreements with landowners. However, the secretary was also expected to cooperate
with “local associations o f stockmen” in the administrative districts, a feature
Representative Taylor, the bill’s sponsor, called “democracy on the range” (Klyza 1996).
National and local advisory boards, made up mostly o f ranchers, heavily influenced the
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act. One scholar asserts that these boards determined the allocation o f permits,
supervised the expenditure o f range improvement funds, were influential in the selection
o f staff, and were the “real decision makers” in setting grazing fees. Though these boards
were supposed to be advisory, in reality they established and enacted the rules (Foss
1960). The grazing boards were quid pro quo, designed to appease the furious cowboy,
who was accustomed to a free range and who would put up with only so much regulation.
And he would only put up with regulation that was short-lived. Importantly, the
act also included the phrase, “pending final disposal,” to pacify westerners who felt the
rangeland should be transferred to private ownership, or at the very lest, the states. Until
the passage o f the Federal Land Policy Management Act in 1976, ranchers would hold
onto this technicality. Many believed that the disposal o f the public lands was imminent.
And even though they didn’t own the land, even though it remained public, ranchers
acted like the range was still theirs. They continued to control it, and the Grazing Service
(established by the Taylor Grazing Act as the first “regulatory” range agency) and later
the BLM (created from the consolidation o f the Grazing Service and the General Land
Office in 1946) had no choice but to let them. They both suffered under the image o f an
agency that ultimately possessed a short life.
Grazing fees on rangeland were set at low levels (at the enactment o f the Taylor
Grazing Act, Forest Service fees were three times as high) and would continue to stay
low despite numerous efforts to raise them. Permits almost always went to existing stock
interests. The Grazing Service was constantly understaffed, underfunded, and at the
whim o f congressmen who controlled its budget. Wilkinson explains that “the new
agency could do little more than rubber stamp decisions made by the advisory boards
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dominated by ranchers, the very group the Taylor Grazing Act supposedly had been
enacted to regulate” (Wilkinson 1992). Nonetheless, the stage had been set with the
Taylor Grazing Act. The disposal o f western land had ended, in practice. Regulation had
begun. Ranchers’ attempts at reclaiming the range, such as the Sagebrush Rebellion and
the county supremacy movements o f the eighties, would remain only that—attempts.
The Taylor Grazing Act represented the first, major incursion in the ranchers’
hegemony on the range. And the attackers came away with some success. Next the
battle moved to the setting o f AUM fees (animal unit per month or the amount o f forage
needed for one cow and a calf or five sheep for one month). Since the inception o f the
act, fees remained at a low $.05 per cow or horse per month and $.01 per sheep or goat.
While the Great Depression and former use o f the free range may have made these levels
seem acceptable, it wasn’t until 1947 that fees rose to $.08— and not without a fight from
livestock groups, senators, and western congressmen. This scenario, the struggle to raise
fees on BLM lands to fair market value, was to be repeated again and again: the fee
painfully inched up by pennies over the decades and sometimes even dropped.
Historically, AUMs have been kept far below fair market value as well as below the fees
charged on private and state lands (Klyza 1996). The ranchers and their western
congressmen didn’t own the land, but they managed to control it.
Even today, critics charge that the federal grazing program is heavily subsidized.
And environmental groups—such as the Natural Resources Defense Council, the Oregon
Natural Desert Association, and Oregon Natural Resources Council— have made their
voices heard over the low fees, which they feel subsidize commodity-interest on public
lands as well as encourage overgrazing, which in turn reduces fish habitat and forage
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available for wildlife. In 1985, Office o f Management and Budget studies concluded that
grazing revenues only covered approximately 35 percent o f spending on such programs;
by not charging fair market value, the government may have lost $500 million over the
last ten years place (Klyza 1996). But twenty-eight senators and forty representatives
urged President Reagan to extend the current fee program for ten years—he did so
indefinitely.
Yet the situation is not so simple that individual ranchers can be singled out as
avaricious cowboys, seeking undue profit on the range. The grazing system, fair or
unfair, puts ranchers in a position where the low-fee grazing permits have become a sort
o f property right. Whenever a ranch is bought or sold, the federal grazing permits are an
integral part o f the deal, since BLM leases are often carried with the base ranch. Thus,
private lands are worth more money when associated grazing privileges are associated
with them. The value o f these grazing leases has become capitalized and amortized into
the value o f the private land, and ranchers pay for the leases up-front whenever they buy
or re-finance a ranch (Klyza 1996). Klyza points out that, because o f this, you can’t quite
call the low AUMs subsidies, since they affect the value o f a rancher’s deeded land. To
further complicate matters, the permits have been used as security for bank loans and
included in the appraised value o f the lands. Wilkinson writes that “politically, a
proposal to reduce AUMs or to increase grazing fees have translated into lobbying by the
banking industry as well as the ranching industry” (Wilkinson 1992).
Here the issue o f control and ownership arise once more. If you possess a grazing
lease that is attached to a ranch, which increases the ranch’s worth when it’s bought or
sold, who really controls that lease land—even if it is federally owned? This issue would
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be played out during the Steens negotiations when ranchers received five to seven times
as much land in the low country, plus millions o f dollars in economic adjustments, in
exchange for their private land with its associated public land grazing privileges in the
Steens high country.
Ranchers most often won the battle over fees, but environmentalists made some
gains with the enactment of the Federal Land Policy and Management Act (FLPMA) o f
1976. The passage o f FLMPA represented a significant challenge to the grazing industry.
After the Taylor Grazing Act, it was the second great gauge in the ranchers’ hegemony
and had twice the impact. For the first time since its birth in 1946, the BLM’s mission
was articulated through congressional mandate. The act replaced over 3,500 public land
laws relating to the BLM with a single organic act (Dana and Fairfax 1980). The BLM
would now be a professional land-planning agency—not an agency temporarily holding
title to the federal rangeland and, in the meantime, virtually giving away its economic and
ecological value to industry.
Importantly, FLPMA declared that the public lands the BLM managed should
remain public—officially ending what had ended in practice with the Taylor Grazing Act.
That phrase, “pending final disposal,” was itself disposed of, and with it ranchers’ hopes
o f ever returning to their complete rule o f the range. They had believed and acted as if it
belonged to them in the four decades since the passage o f the Taylor Grazing Act, but
FLMPA shattered that belief in future ownership and, for the first time, began to impinge
on their control. The range was now acknowledged as important to wildlife as well as
cattle and sheep, and the public lands were declared subject to multiple-use management.
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Still, FLPMA did not escape the rancher’s home rule. Grazing interests received
strong representation as the act evolved in the House Public Lands Subcommittee—
which was dominated by westerners and thus became more pro-industry and less
environmental than some members o f Congress would have favored. But without certain
compromises, there would have be no organic bill at all (Klyza 1996). These included a
lack o f resolution on the grazing fee controversy; ten-year permits for grazing (the
current permittee had the first priority for lease renewal—virtually guaranteeing a rancher
the use o f public lands as long as they are slated for "grazing); and reasonable
compensation for private improvements on public lands if a permit is cancelled (which
portrays the extent to which the permits have become like property rights). Additionally,
grazing advisory boards, which were eliminated in the early 1970s and replaced by
multiple use advisory boards, were brought back to life. As before, members were to be
elected from permittees in each area.
Despite the additional regulation that FLPMA brought, ranchers shoved their
heels in their stirrups and sat deep in the saddle. They weren’t about to give up. Klyza
simplifies the complexity o f decades o f wrangling, economics, and politics by
summarizing a century of grazing policy as a “captured policy program.” Since the
beginning, grazing was instituted with an “extralegal property-rights system, low fees,
and home rule on the range” (Klyza 1996). Ranchers, as an interest group on the federal
rangeland, gained control before the rules were set and managed to hold onto that control
fiercely. After the rules were established, they developed a powerful legislative capacity
through influence over the state legislatures and the ability to ward o ff federal control.
Though there are fewer than 30,000 ranchers holding grazing permits for BLM lands,

26

these ranchers have a disproportionate amount o f power nationally; they hold key
political positions in thinly populated western states.
This is what brought the ranchers, as an interest group, to the negotiation table at
Steens: a strong political history, at least four generations o f culture and economy on the
mountain, and the virtual control o f the public rangeland. Though there are only about
thirty-five o f them, they are an institutional presence in Harney County, on Steens. But
the Steens agreement—preceded by the effects o f the Taylor Grazing Act, FLPMA, and a
successful environmental coalition built on science, politics, and changing economics and
demographics— would signal a major change.

Republican Congressman Greg Walden represents Oregon’s 2nd District, which
encompasses almost all o f the land east o f the Cascades as well as part o f southern
Oregon. His district comprises over two-thirds o f the state—twenty counties or 70,000
square miles. Walden was a major opponent o f monument designation at Steens. His
office wrote the original bill for the legislation. Though Representative Walden
represents a minority o f the people in the state o f Oregon, I was told—more than once—
by both environmentalists and BLM staff, that only he could have sponsored and passed
this bill. Andy Kerr, a self-proclaimed “political hack,” offered this insight:
“Greg Walden is very proud o f the fact that he got the first cow-free wilderness in
Harney County. And there’s something to be said for that. There’s an old Vulcan phrase
that Spock uses in one o f the Star Trek movies. My metaphor for it is only Nixon could
go to China. Which is true. Only the greatest anticommunist could open up the door to
communist China. Prior to this, you never saw any Green Republican or Democrat in the
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United States Congress pushing cow-free wilderness. But it was Walden and [Oregon
Republican Senator Gordon] Smith that put it on the table. Such a deal.”
Such is the power of a western congressman in the grazing arena.
In a speech on the House Floor on October 4,2000, the day the legislation passed,
Walden waxed poetic about the people o f Harney County and drew upon the virtues o f
ranching culture, part o f an institution that is deeply ingrained in the psyche of the
American public—deeply ingrained because it draws upon the powerful agrarian myth.
Ranching has survived as much upon this myth as it has on its political and physical grip
o f the range. It is the myth o f the industrious, brave, and lone cowboy settling a wild
land and taming it. It upholds the sacred American tenets o f freedom, individualism, and
opportunity. It is the myth that Giles French and E.R, Jackman dwelt upon so adoringly,
and it is so strong that, even today, a politician can shamelessly romanticize it. “These
are people whose ancestors were encouraged by the federal government to take the risk of
expanding our Nation’s frontier, to risk life and property to settle the Wild West.”
Walden proclaimed to Congress. ‘They were homesteaders o f the 1800s, people o f
undaunted courage who followed the trail to the West blazed by Lewis and Clark some
two-hundred years ago.”
And later in the speech: ‘These are people whose closest neighbor is often miles
and miles away. They are self-reliant people with soft hearts but rugged spirits.”
Finally: Tt is a place where written contracts are not broken because usually
written contracts are not needed, a man’s word is all it takes, a handshake will do. They
do not get much from the government other than a tax bill, and they sure do not ask for a
lot in return” (Walden 2000).
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Walden could have been sentimentalizing any ranchers in the West, at any time in
the past hundred years. And though their numbers are small, these communities, these
“rugged spirits,” through their representatives in the House and Senate, have dominated
the management and policy of public rangeland in the West. Over and over again,
western congressmen slashed budgets and stalled or killed bills over grazing acts or
attempts to raise the grazing fee on public lands. Home rule on the range has held its
grip.
It is certain that E.R. Jackman believed in the agrarian myth, and maybe he’d
disagree with Bill Marlett’s assertion that ranchers aren’t environmentalists or be
surprised at Andy Kerr’s ‘Visceral antipathy to livestock.” Three million more stomachs
each year may require American beef, as Jackman believes, but, as Charles Wilkinson
points out, the federal lands contribute only 2 percent to our national livestock
production, while western private land contributes 17 percent. Private lands in the East
make up the rest, accounting for 81 percent (Wilkinson 1992). But it must be
remembered that the myth o f the cowboy translates into political reality. Despite these
small numbers, more acres o f the eleven western states are dedicated to cattle ranching
than anything else: 258 million acres o f public rangeland. And the number o f AUMS on
BLM land is steady at 13.5 million, not much below the number o f grazing permits set
two years after the Taylor Grazing Act was passed.
But times are changing. In May, 2000, the Supreme Court unanimously made a
ruling that upholds regulatory changes adopted by the Department o f Interior in 1995: the
elimination o f the preference that grazing permit holders had when their permits were up
for renewal; the allowance o f non-ranchers to hold grazing permits; and the right o f the
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government to hold title to any range improvements, such as fences or water systems,
even if they were built by ranchers (Gregory 2000).
Times are changing. After four generations o f family ranching, John Witzel no
longer ranches. Environmentalists hold up the legislated cattle-free wilderness at Steens
as proof o f a new era. And it is. The crack in ranchers’ home rule on the range was first
opened by the Taylor Grazing Act and FLPMA, and then widened by changing
economics, demographics, and values. The Steens agreement represents another fracture,
grown from the first, which may have broken that hegemony entirely. Andy Kerr opined
that the ranchers were willing to accept the cattle-free provision, as well as negotiate land
trades, because they have “much political, social, and economic incentive to move their
operations off o f the high Steens. Increasing conflicts with other users, legal
requirements under the Endangered Species Act, and other considerations are ‘forcing’
them out.”
“I guess there’s no doubt about it that environmental laws aire making ranching
more complicated, more time consuming, and to a certain extent, more expensive than
historically it was. It’s difficult, but by no means impossible,” said Stacy Davies when I
mentioned Kerr’s comment. ‘I ’m sure they’d like to think that they’ve put us in a vice
and have got a big squeeze on us,” he continued, “but I think it can go two ways. When
we start having successes and documenting our successes, it makes them nervous too.”
Those successes might have translated into part o f the ranchers’ defense against a
monument designation. Stacey Davies, though admitting to land abuse by Roaring
Springs' previous owners, argues that the ranch currently practices some o f the best land
management strategies and grazing regimes— it has been adjusting with the changing
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times. Though Bill Marlett states he’s never heard o f a progressive rancher, Davies
asserts even the Secretary o f the Interior recognized Roaring Springs’ conservation
efforts. “Stacey,” Davies claimed Babbitt said, “you must either be a really nice guy or
. you must be doing a good job. The United States Fish and Wildlife won’t get o ff my
back for fear I’m going to disturb your conservation agreement.”
Perhaps he thought they’d fail. Perhaps he knew, or at least hoped, they’d
succeed. But Babbitt stood back and gave ranchers, environmentalists, the governor, and
the Oregon delegation an opportunity to try and cooperate. The time was right for
change.
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IV
Cascade Divide:
The Rise of Desert Conservation
The most pervasive and insidious threat to the Oregon Desert is domestic livestock
grazing. Livestock have done more damage to the Earth than the chainsaw. . .
They are an abomination. —Andy Kerr, Oregon Desert Guide

Diverse regions are often simply defined by where the population resides. This
holds true for Oregon, where the metropolitan areas o f Portland, Salem, and Eugene dot
the Willamette River Valley and Interstate 5. Most Oregonians squeeze themselves into
this lush farming belt between the Cascade Mountains and the Coast Range. Here,
residents have never had to go without the color green. They are accustomed to big trees
and bigger volcanoes. They are accustomed to having their way. Because o f them,
Oregon has gained the reputation as one o f the most libera! places in the West. For when
it comes to politics, western Oregon urbanites almost always steer the ship for the entire
state—imposing their values on the “empty” two-thirds, east o f the Cascades. Yet though
the people living on the edge o f temperate rainforests and the Pacific Ocean are known to
define what Oregon is all about, look at any map and you’ll see that what dominates
Oregon geographically is desert.
Portland is a microcosm o f the Cascade geographic divide o f Oregon itself. The
metro looks seaward and abroad. Its sidewalks are slick with water and covered in moss;
skyscrapers, banks, museums, and universities attest to its financial and cultural wealth.
The city sits at the crossroads o f the Willamette, the river o f western Oregon, and the
Columbia, the river o f the Pacific Northwest. Portland is home to national environmental
groups and a liberal, voting population within an hour’s drive o f the capital—people with
the means to influence the fate o f Steens Mountain. David Blackstun, BLM Bums
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District Supervisory Natural Resource Specialist and Assistant Field Manager,
commented, “There’s a social evolution as we become more affluent. People have the
ability from Portland and Eugene to talk about environmentalism and not have any threat
to their well being, their economic livelihood. They like coming out here and walking in
the gorges and not seeing cows or cow pies.”
The Cascade divide is also representative o f the quintessential urban/rural
divide—a divide that defines not only Oregon but also the West at large. And it affects
the way we view our public lands. When I talked to Bill Marlett, executive director o f
ONDA, in Bend, a small city in Central Oregon that is rapidly becoming a recreationtourist mecca, he spoke o f the issue in a quiet, blunt way. “The fact is, 99% o f the
population in the West is urban,” he said, estimating to make a point. “And the cold,
hard reality is that the public lands are going to become the playground o f people living
in the West and the United States in general. That trend is becoming very clear.”
Even though Steens Mountain exists in one o f the most rural, remote parts o f the
state, it is not exempt from urban recreational needs or environmental values. It is not
exempt from the changing economics and demographics o f the West. While Secretary
Babbitt worked diligently to develop an environmental legacy for both himself and
President Clinton, Oregon’s Governor John Kitzhaber began to consider his own legacy
and the jewels that existed within his state— ecologically sensitive places and areas where
people, especially urban people, might find solitude. According to Kevin Smith, Director
o f Governor Kitzhaber’s Resource Office in Washington D.C., Steens was very high, if
not his number one priority. The governor’s office, along with other Oregon Democratic
senators and representatives, quickly joined the negotiations—playing a part in every step
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o f the legislative process. Peter Green, the governor’s forestry advisor, explained that,
“there was this logic train that the governor bought into. The first was that this was a
national, statewide interest. To go there you say, look, this isn’t just for Harney County
to decide.”
And so Harney Countians bargained for Steens Mountain, little known by most o f
the country and even some Oregonians. Despite their sentiment that locals knew the
mountain best, power from the distant urban East and a closer urban West would help
determine the mountain’s fate.

The Steens Mountain area is a place o f exceptional ecological diversity, a “sky
island” that supports plants and animals otherwise found in widely separated areas, either
farther north or on other mountains. Several plant species, including the Steens Mountain
paintbrush and Steens Mountain thistle, grow here and nowhere else. Biologists have
described five different vegetation zones from the Alvord Basin to the tundra zone at the
mountain’s highest elevations (Brown 2000). Steens is home to rare and endangered
flora, the endemic Catlow Valley redband trout and Borax Lake chub, bighorn sheep,
wild horse herds o f Spanish descent, sage grouse, raptors, 18,000 head o f cattle, and
thirty-five ranchers.
Though much o f the mountain is in the public domain, around twenty-five percent
o f it is privately owned—about 232,000 acres (before the legislated land trades) (BLM
1999). Despite or because o f the fact that such large tracts o f private land existed, a
coalition o f environmental groups has continuously pushed for stricter protection o f
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Steens. Over the past ten years there were multiple initiatives to provide a special
designation for the mountain.
‘There’s been proposals to make Steens a national park, there’s been proposals
for a national monument, there’s been proposals for a national conservation area, and
Congressman [Bob] Smith, a former congressman here, actually submitted a bill in the
early nineties that went forward but didn’t really get anywhere,” explained David
Blackstun. Smith’s bill, according to Blackstun, didn’t have as much collaborative work
in the community as the 2000 bill that finally passed. Predictably, environmentalists
were not happy with it. It’s safe to say that Smith’s national conservation area proposal
was a conservative reaction to environmentalists’ eye on the mountain. The vast high
desert is primarily made up o f “unprotected” BLM land, except for Wilderness Study
Areas. This fact was not lost on the state’s growing and powerful environmental
community, who envisioned Steens Mountain as part o f a larger Southeast Oregon and
upper Great Basin protection proposal. Their plans included several million acres o f
designated wilderness with Steens Mountain as the crown jewel.
“I guess one thing that has amazed me, that I’ve learned more out o f this than
anything, is how the environmental community has gained power,” said Stacy Davies
when I talked to him in October, 2000. I had finished asking questions about the
particulars o f the bill and the process o f negotiation, and we were nearing the end o f our
conversation—one that had been interrupted by phone calls from the Oregonian, the
Bend Bulletin, and TV camera crews. The bill had just passed the House that morning,
and Davies’ “sound bites” were in high demand. “What gave a guy like—and I’m not
picking on him—Bill Marlett, what gave him the right to even be involved in this
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process? How did he gain any reason to be involved in this process? What empowered
him?” Davies suddenly asked me. I commented that national environmental laws had
something to do with it, but it wasn’t exactly the answer he was looking for. “Yeah, but
him as an individual—when they looked at the players at the table . . . Answer me, I
guess I’m going to ask you the question. What gave him the right to be at the table?’
Maps o f Steens, Roaring Springs’ property lines, and numerous GIS copies,
which had continuously evolved and changed with the legislation, lay scattered thick
across the table. I looked out the window of the ranch office. Cattle spaced themselves
evenly across the Catlow Valley, which looked remarkably lush for the time o f year. At
the valley’s southwestern edge, clouds mixed with Hart Mountain, a 9,000-foot volcanic
fault block that rises 4,000 feet above the Warner Valley and its wetlands. From where I
sat, it looked as if the bowls, canyons, and blue ridges o f the mountain could be the
underside o f heavy clouds or the clouds could be the mountain itself.
The Hart Mountain National Antelope Refuge, encompassing 240,000 acres or
375 square miles, was established in 1936 to preserve, manage, and study pronghorn
antelope and other wildlife. But like Malheur National Wildlife Refuge, livestock
grazing continued there—until 1991. A severe drought prompted the removal o f cattle in
order to allow the vegetation to recover. It also prompted a coalition o f conservation
groups, including The Wilderness Society, the Audubon Society o f Portland, Oregon
Wildlife Federation, and B ill Marlett’s Oregon Natural Desert Association (ONDA) to
file a lawsuit against the U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service. The groups charged that the
federal agency’s management o f the refuge favored livestock and was not consistent with
the purposes for which the refuge was created. The lawsuit brought a settlement that
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created a new fifteen-year management plan for the refuge, which was implemented in
1994. Livestock were removed, grazing permits retired, and the unhappy ranchers simply
had to adjust. At the time, Marlett called the result “one o f the largest cow-free areas of
public land in the Great Basin” (Grossman 2000).
I told Davies that I guessed Bill Marlett’s power stemmed form ONDA’s '
involvement with Oregon desert issues and participation in lawsuits for the past twenty
years. I also supposed that his power came from the movement in general and its attempt
to enforce environmental laws through litigation.
“And you’re right,” Davies said. “I guess the thing I learned out o f this was that
his predecessors got the laws on the books. And the question I keep asking m yself is how
do you do that?’ He paused. “Essentially he took up a cause that he’s impassioned with,
and then he infiltrated the press. The way you do that is through lawsuits and just
pounding, pounding, pounding—being relentless with your message.”

The Oregon desert conservation message is personified by Alice Elshoff, who
likes to say that she was bom in 1934, the year the Taylor Grazing Act was passed, and
hopes to see grazing discontinued on public lands within her lifetime. We had talked in
her living room the evening before Stacy Davies and I met. The outcome o f the bill was
unknown at that point. She hoped for its passage—it contained more than
conservationists ever could have received with a national monument designation.
On the wall behind her hung a picture of a sandhill crane feeding in a marshy
pool. Throughout her house were photographs o f birds, many taken at Malheur, in which
the creatures appear almost luminary. Alice Elshoff and her husband Cal first starting
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coming to the refuge during the fifties and remember when the road was paved no more
than ten miles out o f Bums. I asked her how she became involved in the Steens issue and
environmentalism. "I actually started ONDA,” she laughed. Elshoff and another
conservationist became politically active in 1976, when Congress mandated the BLM to
inventory potential wilderness areas (all roadless areas o f 5,000 acres or more and all
roadless islands with wilderness characteristics) by 1991 under the Federal Land Policy
Management Act (FLPMA). Since the 1964 Wilderness Act did not require any review
o f roadless areas managed by the BLM, this was an important step for the preservation o f
BLM land.
A problematic aspect o f FLPMA was the classification o f BLM potential
wilderness areas. The agency was directed to protect the wilderness qualities o f all
identified areas with wilderness characteristics during the study period, while
simultaneously allowing existing uses—including mining and grazing activities—to
continue. As the desert conservation community grew, this would eventually lead to
lawsuits against the agency, as it did on Steens. A typical scenario might include a
rancher, who constructs a fence to protect a stream or riparian area in a Wilderness Study
Area (WSA)— attempting to obey the law and protect wilderness qualities—and an
environmental group, which subsequently sues, because by building a fence that rancher
has violated the act by impairing its potential to become designated wilderness. It makes
grazing in that WSA and simultaneously protecting its wilderness qualities almost
impossible. Andy Kerr describes the situation this way:
“The way the BLM has interpreted its mandate under section 603 o f FLPMA is
that it has to manage these areas so as to not impair their suitability for wilderness.
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There’s a fair argument to be made that it’s actually more difficult for ranchers to operate
their grazing operation in WSAs than in wilderness, because historically livestock has
been grandfathered into wilderness. The downside is we want a lot more wilderness than
WSAs, but the WSAs have a bigger interim o f protection.”
While WSAs have competing directives—the allowance o f existing uses and the
protection o f wilderness qualities—designated wilderness areas virtually protect the
continuance o f livestock grazing, if that right has been grandfathered in. But most
ranchers hate wilderness designation as much as environmentalists love it— and for the
same reasons: not only for the additional protection and restrictions it brings, but also for
what it means. Wilderness is commonly acknowledged as the highest form o f protection,
a place where “man” is a visitor only.
Elshoff related how her grassroots group was involved in that early classification
process o f WSAs. She said that the BLM came up with its initial inventory in eastern
Oregon, which was about six million acres, and then began running the numbers through
filters, dropping areas that wouldn’t be studied. The agency’s cuts brought the acreage
that was to be designated as Wilderness Study Areas down to about 2.5 million. Elshoff
couldn’t believe it. “A bunch o f us who liked the desert began to think, ‘Whoa, look at
the places they’ve dropped. This is shocking, a lot o f those are wonderful places,”’ she
said. In the early eighties, they put together a group o f volunteers, which would
eventually become ONDA, and began sending people out into the desert to do their own
inventory, which would eventually be called the Sage Proposal.
ONDA monitored the inventory process and testified in Washington D.C. over
lands they felt shouldn’t be dropped from WSA status; the group’s work resulted in an
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expansion o f acreage declared WSA. By 1989, ONDA incorporated and received its
non-profit status. By the time the BLM inventory was finalized, the group was well
established and so began tackling other desert issues, especially grazing. Members never
lost sight o f the Sage Proposal, which in 1992 grew into a more detailed and vast
vision—one which not only protected land but also established grazing as enemy number
one in the desert. It became known as the Oregon High Desert Protection Act (OHDPA).
“We were stumping for that for a long, long time,” said Elshoff.
“The myth o f the cowboy is as strong as ever,” Bill Marlett told John Sterling,
writing for Earth Island Journal, in 1993. “But cowboys are not environmentalists”
(Sterling 1993). And so a coalition o f environmental groups unveiled the Oregon High
Desert Protection Act, which seeks to prohibit grazing on almost six million acres o f
public land in eastern Oregon. Steens Mountain was the centerpiece o f the proposal, a
500,000-acre national park surrounded by a 523,000-acre national preserve. OHDPA is a
conservationist’s utopian box, filled with forty-seven wilderness areas, three national
monuments, the expansion and creation o f wildlife refuges, and fifty-four wild and scenic
rivers.
But perhaps the most controversial issue is the phase-out o f livestock grazing in
ten years: a mandatory buy-out o f grazing permits in all special designations, including
wilderness areas. Grazing has been grandfathered into wilderness designations since
1922, when Aldo Leopold wrote his management proposal to establish the nation’s first
formally protected wilderness area in New M exico’s Gila National Forest. The
Wilderness Act o f 1964 also allows for grazing to continue in areas where it historically
has been allowed. Andy Kerr and Mark Salvo write that “every relevant wilderness bill
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enacted by Congress has included language to provide for livestock grazing” (Kerr and
Salvo 2000).
OHDPA’s call to phase out grazing was and is a fairly radical idea, one that
ranchers and even other conservationists oppose. “We came to a kind o f a split,”
explained Elshoff, “which always seems to happen, unfortunately. The Sierra Club went
off on its own because the leaders weren’t happy with our trying to get grazing out of
wilderness—actually redoing the wilderness law. When it was written in 1964, grazing
was not the big issue, and the grazers were cleverer than we were and were able to get
language in there that grandfathered it in. We thought it was time to revisit that.”
The alternative proposal, supported primarily by the Sierra Club, is called the
Oregon Desert Conservation Act (ODCA). It differs little from OHDPA, other than on
the grazing issue. ODCA proposes a mandatory buyout for all non-wilderness special
designations (such as national monuments, wildlife refuges, and national conservation
areas) and requires only voluntary buy-out o f grazing permits in wilderness areas and
non-designated BLM lands in eastern Oregon. In an analysis o f the differences between
ODCA and OHDPA, Bill Marlett writes that though some see cattle-free wilderness as a
political impossibility, “it is critical that we begin our struggle for wilderness protection
by asking for what we want, rather than for what some believe is politically feasible”
(Marlett 1999a).
And though both ODCA and OHDPA still have a bleak political future, cattle-free
wilderness was achieved with the passage o f the 2000 Steens Cooperation Management
and Protection Act. That achievement, says Andy Kerr, happened because the Oregon
conservation community in the arid West is much more exercised about livestock grazing
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than other communities. “The significance o f this Steens legislation is that it’s the first
legislated livestock-free wilderness. And that’s because we made an issue o f it,” he
opined.
“Why compromise at the beginning?” Alice Elshoff asked with a smile. “There’s
always compromising in the end. Why not start out asking for what you really want?”

The phone hadn’t rung in quite awhile at Roaring Springs Ranch. Stacy Davies
and I continued to ponder the rise o f desert conservation, which was quickly changing the
historically powerful face o f ranching in the West. “Farmers and ranchers are the
greatest whiners on earth sometimes. But yet, just try to get these ranchers in this
community to pay their dues through the Harney County Cattleman’s Association. And
they want to stay home and farm. So do I,” he said. “But the reality is, if people want to
make a difference in the United States they still can. We may not agree with their cause,
but the bottom line is, if they want to make a difference they can.” He added, “And
whining doesn’t do you any good.”
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V
A Legacy of Conquest?
This time he [Babbitt] comes west bearing a big stick and a small carrot.
--Ed Marston, High Country News, April 2000
On a clear, bright day in March o f 2000, Mike Golden sat across from me in Mrs.
Beasley’s cafe in Redmond, Oregon—a town that lies just north o f Bend on Highway 97,
under a western skyline o f Oregon volcanoes. Golden, a retired fisheries biologist and
chair o f the Southeast Oregon Resource Advisory Council, had suggested that we meet in
this greasy spoon, steak-and-eggs, family restaurant where easy-listening hits o f the
sixties and seventies are piped softly through the speakers and flapjacks span the
diameter o f a plate. Uniformed waitresses in pantyhose and tennis shoes made sure our
coffee cups were eternally filled. “If you don’t mind, I’d like to go back and talk about
the preamble to this,” Golden said. “Because had not Secretary Babbitt come out with
this big plan to make a lot o f national monuments throughout the West, the Steens, I
don’t think, would have ever come to a real head.”
Golden spoke o f August 1999, when the Secretary and Oregon Governor John
Kitzhaber stopped by Bums and Steens Mountain in an effort to resolve the long-standing
requests for designation o f the mountain. After visiting Steens, the Secretary pronounced
it a “primb resource o f national importance” (Bemton 1999). But the mountain was just
one stop on Babbitt’s tour o f the West, the purpose o f which was to create a “short list”
o f places to be considered for national monument designation. David Blackstun o f the
Bums District BLM put it this way: “As the current administration comes to an end, the
opportunities for special designation o f Steens Mountain have again become ripe.”
Blackstun referred to what is now being called the “Clinton Land Legacy”—a legacy that
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some feel began with the designation o f Utah’s Grand Staircase-Escalante National
Monument in 1996. In an article in the Bend, Oregon, Bulletin (Witty 1999), Senator
Gordon Smith o f Oregon bluntly opined, “This is an administration in search o f a legacy.
The legacy they have now is not an honorable one.”
Rather than declaring Steens a park or a monument, Secretary Babbitt indicated
that he would support a National Conservation Area (NCA), designated through
congressional action and local involvement. In the end, Steens became neither a
monument nor an NCA, but at the outset people believed they would have to accept
either one or the other. National Conservation Areas are an established, though seldomused, form o f land designation. The first NCA, King Range in California, was created in
1970, and places like the more familiar Nevada’s Red Rock Canyon and Idaho’s Birds of
Prey followed in 1990 and 1993. The BLM’s definition o f an NCA is “an area o f the
public lands managed by the BLM which has been established by Congress for the
purpose o f protecting and conserving identified resource values o f National interest”
(BLM 1999).
Stacy Davies’ definition was a bit more simplified. “When they first brought this
up, we looked hard at a national conservation area as a solution,” he explained, “and the
more we looked at it, the more we decided that a NCA in ten years will be the same thing
as a monument. What’s going to happen is that Rand McNally is going to figure out that
it’s a new name for a unique place and it will end up on the map.” Locals wanted to keep
Steens as a relatively unknown, undesignated tract o f public land; they didn’t want a
national “anything,” with an inevitable increase o f tourists in their backyard. But
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everyone seemed to know that things would not stay the same; change had been set in
motion years before Babbitt stood on the mountain.
According to the BLM’s David Blackstun, Babbitt addressed the viability o f wellmanaged grazing on Steens Mountain and said that he did not want to eliminate it.
Unlike many environmentalists, Oregon Governor John Kitzhaber also supported
continued grazing on the mountain. Kevin Smith, Kitzhaber’s Director o f National
Resources in Washington, D.C., said that the governor’s intention was not to change the
economy o f the area but to protect the local character and economy. “We wanted to help
the ranchers not lose their holdings,” he explained, “because they’re being bought out by
folks who want to develop—put up condos and resorts, which can sometimes bring much
higher prices and escalate land values.” Ranchers held at least one good card in their
hands; both nationally and at the state level, their needs were addressed—at least to a
certain point. Locals were encouraged to participate in the process o f determining the
mountain’s future.
However, the Secretary also said that if the legislative effort was unsuccessful he
would be willing to take matters into his own hands and recommend monument
designation through executive order. “I f Congress does not act, what I said, and what I
reiterate, is that I will consider asking the president to use his power,” Babbitt told Hal
Bemton o f the Portland Oregonian (Bemton 1999).
This explicit threat set the wheels in motion for a new brand o f politics,
collaborative efforts, and natural resource debate. It originated in a complex legacy and
was the result o f the ever-tense interactions between local and national interests. As
Stacy Davies explained in frustration, “It’s unfortunate that land management and politics
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are two different things.” However different the land and bureaucracy may be, the two
would not be separated on Steens Mountain. And in this regard the mountain was not
alone.

On September 18,1996, while overlooking the Grand Canyon with A1 Gore,
Robert Redford, Sierra Club President Adam Werbach, writer Terry Tempest Williams,
and Bruce Babbitt (and without a single elected official from Utah), President Clinton
made an announcement. “Seventy miles to the north o f here in Utah lies some o f the most
remarkable land in the world. We will set aside 1.7 million acres o f it” (Clinton 1996).
Just over seventy miles to the north, in the small town o f Escalante, the President and
Interior Secretary Bruce Babbitt were hanged in effigy.
“I can’t believe that a president would do this and never walk on one square inch
o f the land he’s designating,” said Utah House Speaker Mel Brown to the Salt Lake
Tribune, “To my knowledge, he’s never even looked at it out the window o f Air Force
One” (Harrie 1996). Clinton, indeed, avoided Utah—a state where he placed third,
behind even Ross Perot, in the 1992 election. The dramatic panorama o f the Grand
Canyon’s South Rim provided a stunning backdrop for the designation o f the national
monument, especially since the president was running neck-and-neck with Bob Dole in
the 1996 race. Vice President A1 Gore introduced Clinton at the Grand Canyon ceremony
as “the environmental president” and called the designation “a great monument to
stewardship” (W oolf 1996).
Clinton had no chance o f winning Utah’s five electoral votes; but he had a good
chance o f garnering the “green” vote outside o f Utah and the West. By the power granted
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to him by the Antiquities Act o f 1906, President Clinton, with a stroke o f the pen,
transformed an extensive tract o f BLM land into a national monument. Clinton was
acting well within his presidential rights. From its passage over ninety years ago until
Clinton set aside Escalante, the Antiquities Act had been used on sixty-five occasions to
designate or expand national monuments by every president except Nixon, Reagan, and
George Bush (Judson 2000). Each time the act was used, a president was allowed
freedom from compromise. He did not have to wrangle with public sentiment or
congressional opinion in order to get his way. “I thank goodness that the Antiquities Act
was on the books,” said Clinton on the South Rim, citing Bryce Canyon, Zion, Glacier
Bay, Olympic, and Grand Teton National Parks as places forever preserved by presidents,
without regard to party, for “all o f us and for generations to come” (Clinton 1996).
A few days after the President proclaimed the Grand Staircase-Escalante region a
national monument, Kanab residents held an angry rally at the town’s high school. Many
area businesses closed in recognition o f the demonstration; the town was decorated in
black balloons. Residents wore black ribbons, which they said signified the death o f
local rights. At the end o f the rally, high school students released fifty o f those balloons,
symbolizing, they claimed, the infringement o f federal power over the states (Associated
Press 1999; Larmer 1996).
But in mid-January o f 2000, President Clinton again stood on the wind-whipped
South Rim o f the Grand Canyon and announced the creation o f another monument: the
million-acre Grand Canyon-Parashant National Monument in northwest Arizona. Once
more, the President frustrated many locals. They, like the ranching families at Steens,
saw the new designation as a flashing neon billboard that would draw thousands o f new
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visitors each year, forever changing the remote character o f the area. But unlike
Escalante, there were no black balloons, no effigies, no protests in the street. According
to Lynn Alder, one reason for the paler response was that President Clinton chose “a
kinder, gentler—though no less final— approach” (Alder 2000). Instead o f surprising
local ranchers and government officials, as he did at Escalante, Clinton hinted at the
designation through Secretary Bruce Babbitt as early as May 1999. Furthermore,
elaborates Alder, “instead o f dropping what some considered a political bombshell less
v

than two months before an election, Clinton made his announcement more than ten
months before this lame-duck term ends.”
v

He also softened the blow by simultaneously announcing two other monuments
and expanding another: Agua Fria in central Arizona, which protects a 71,000 acre area
that contains one o f the most significant systems o f late prehistoric sites; the California
Coastal National Monument, encompassing islands, reefs, rocks, and pinnacles 12 miles
out from the state’s coastline; and the 7,680 acre expansion o f Pinnacles National
Monument, originally designated by Theodore Roosevelt in 1908.
According to Paul Larmer, in another High Country News article, “the persistent
political opposition to [Escalante] has convinced Bruce Babbitt to take a new tack. . . Let
the locals come up with a protection plan. If they don’t, he adds, he’ll ask the
administration to unleash the Antiquities Act” (Larmer 1999). Which is exactly what he
did on the Shivwits Plateau at what is now Parashant National Monument. The secretary
proposed federal protection for a 550,000-acre strip o f land, but vowed from the start that
locals would have a say in the matter. Federal designation would occur only if they could
not reach consensus through legislation. In a plot line similar to the script for Steens
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Mountain, Babbitt attended town hall meetings and sought the support o f local and state
government officials and ranchers.
Attempting to head off national monument designation, Republican Senator Jon
Kyi and Representative Bob Stump introduced separate bills that would create a Shivwits
Plateau National Conservation Area. But Stump’s bill brought the possibility o f paved
roads and required a comprehensive mineral survey within two years. The Secretary was
quick to slam it at a congressional hearing in October 1999. “Several features o f this
legislation actually weakened protections in existing law,” he said (Alder 2000). Senator
Kyi’s bill was more congruent with Babbitt’s vision, but attracted little attention and went
nowhere. In the end, Babbitt waltzed Clinton to the rim o f the Grand Canyon once more,
and locals’ suspicions were confirmed. Like the empty comer o f southeastern Oregon,
the empty comer of the desert Southwest suddenly got a lot o f attention.
The story didn’t end in Arizona. Many places throughout the West were
spotlighted during the last year o f Clinton’s presidency.
In April 2000, Clinton gave national monument status to thirty-four groves of
giant sequoias (328,000 acres) in the Sequoia National Forest o f California’s Sierra
Nevada. On June 9, 2000, the president created four more monuments: Canyons o f the
Ancients, a 164,000-acre monument in the Four Comers region o f Colorado; CascadeSiskiyou, 52,000 acres located at the convergence o f the Klamath and Cascade Mountains
in southern Oregon; the Ironwood Forest, 129,000 acres located 25 miles northwest o f
Tucson, Arizona; and the Hanford Reach, 195,000 acres in south central Washington that
straddle one o f the last free-flowing stretches o f the Columbia River—a critical area for
spawning salmon (Hansen 2000; Hanscom and Matthews 2000). For at least a year,
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Babbitt had talked about monument recommendations for most o f these places with local
officials and residents—a feet most Republican Congressmen conveniently forget when
complaining about Clinton’s “last minute” land grabs.
Dialogue with local communities about Canyons o f the Ancients began in spring
o f 1999 and resulted in numerous Resource Advisory Committee meetings as well as
NCA legislation introduced by Senator Ben Nighthorse Campbell. At the request o f local
community groups, Babbitt visited the area surrounding Cascade-Siskiyou, returned
again with Congressman Greg Walden, and held two subsequent roundtable meetings.
with community representatives. The Hanford Reach o f the Columbia had been the focus
o f attention—as possible designation as a Wild and Scenic River—since 1994, and
Senator Patty Murray asked Babbitt to consider the area for monument designation in
early 2000. And the Pima County Board o f Supervisors forwarded a resolution to the
Secretary in March 2000, seeking national monument designation for the Ironwood
Forest. Babbitt said that he would have preferred congressional action for many o f these
areas, but “it’s the protection that’s important, not the label” (Kelley 2000).
The campaign o f protection continued. July 7,2000, Anderson Cottage: President
Lincoln’s summer’s retreat. November 9,2000, Vermillion Cliffs National Monument:
293,000 acres within the Paria Plateau in Arizona. November 9, 2000: boundary
enlargement to 661,287 acres o f Craters o f the Moon National Monument, Idaho (since
1924 the monument had been enlarged by four other presidential proclamations). On
January 17,2001 (a few weeks before George W. Bush was sworn in), Clinton declared
seven more monuments and expanded an eighth. By the end o f his tenure, the president
had put more than 5.6 million acres under administrative protection. The final seven
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included the Upper Missouri River Breaks (377,000 acres along 149 miles o f the river in
Montana); Pompeys Pillar, where Captain William Clark carved his name and date (51
acres along the Yellowstone River in Montana); Carrizo Plain (204,00 acres in
California); Sonoran Desert (486,000 acres in Arizona); Kasha-Katuwe Tent Rocks (7
million year old volcanic rocks in New Mexico); Minidoka Internment National
Monument (a World War II-era Japanese-American internment camp in south-central
Idaho); U.S. Virgin Island Coral Reef National Monument (more than 12,000 acres o f
submerged lands o ff St. John); and the expansion o f Buck Island R eef National
Monument (now includes 18,000 marine acres o ff St. Croix) (Holland 2001).
Many o f these new monuments received positive reactions— from
conservationists and even local and state officials. During the initial stages, many
involved collaborative processes, which included local interests, public hearings, and
input from the BLM’s Resource Advisory Councils. In an interview with Ed Marston,
Babbitt explained that the administration made a concerted effort not to replicate the
Escalante scenario. “We tried hard to make it up, and let me say that every other one of
the twenty national monuments has been preceded by my personal presence on the
ground, and a considerable sort o f process, discussion with all stakeholders” (Babbitt
2001). That didn’t stop the controversy. Montana’s Republican-controlled legislature
went so far as to pass a resolution, largely symbolic, opposing the Missouri River
designation. State Representative John Witt proclaimed the day Clinton made the
announcement as “Black Wednesday” (Associated Press 2001). And according to some,
the means didn’t quite justify the end. Ken Sizemore, deputy director o f the Five
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Counties Association o f Government in southern Utah, claimed the new, “local”
approach was as “draconian” as the old one.
“The administration is making the same mistake with these new areas,” Sizemore
asserted (Larmer 1999). “Sure, it would be great to have a local, legislative proposal
drive the process, but when you get down to brass tacks, the administration opposes the
concepts and precepts embodied in locally produced legislation.” This may be the case.
Or it may be that examples like Parashant only serve to illustrate Bill Marlett’s belief: if
given the opportunity, locals will tend to look towards their own short-term economic
interests over the interests o f the land. Federal intervention is necessary. Locally
produced legislation will always be tainted with greed. Either way the process is
considered, Babbitt’s strategy seemed to fall short o f a genuine relinquishment o f power.
Though the carrot looked like a tempting offering, it was not an unconditional gift—tied
as it was to the Antiquities Act.
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VI
Collaboration, Cowboys, and Environmentalists
Years ago, when I still lived in western Oregon, I’d drive past Steens Mountain on
my way to the canyons of Utah—to Grand Staircase-Escalante specifically. Back then, I
couldn’t have foreseen how the two places would be linked. But now each landscape is a
bookend supporting volumes o f the Clinton administration’s legacy. The story began
with those redrock canyons I’ve spent weeks exploring and came to a close with a
mountain I’m only beginning to discover. Yet Babbitt approached Steens differently than
Escalante and other recently designated national monuments. The mountain stands
practically alone in a flurry o f presidential proclamations—almost as solitary as it stands
in the sprawling expanse o f the Oregon High Desert— for many different reasons:
politics, geography, the character and vision o f key stakeholders, and timing.
Sybil Ackerman, who represented environmentalists in the Steens Working
Group, gave me one reason why. Ackerman told me that the main difference between
Escalante and Steens is that “Oregon has a great governor and senators like Ron Wyden.
Babbitt has to do a different approach here. In Utah, Clinton didn’t care. In Oregon, he
has to worry about state politics.” To an environmentally minded secretary, names like
Representative Pete DeFazio, Senator Ron Wyden, and Governor John Kitzhaber (who
came out in support o f dam removal on the lower Snake and is known for his progressive
thinking on other environmental issues), can’t be ignored—especially during efforts to
pave the way for A1 Gore’s run at the presidency. Still, Babbitt cut Oregon no slack in the
designation o f the Cascade-Siskiyou National Monument in the southwestern part o f the
state. Why did Steens Mountain end up so differently? There is no pat answer, no
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overriding statement that can be made, except that the situation was complex, unique, and
ripe.
It wasn’t just the presence o f key Democrats that may have influenced Babbitt’s
approach. According to Kevin Smith, director o f Governor Kitzhaber’s Natural Resource
office in Washington, D.C., Republican Senator Gordon Smith and Democratic Senator
Ron Wyden have a strong history o f bipartisan cooperation, especially on natural
resource and environmental issues. Representative Greg Walden, the primary sponsor o f
the legislation, may have seen an opportunity to take advantage o f a mutual respect found
throughout the Oregon delegation to come up with an alternative to a monument.
‘I ’ll give my theory,” said Smith. “A lot o f legislation, it’s a human endeavor.
With the personalities involved in the Steens Mountain Project—you had a group o f
people, a delegation, and a governor who felt comfortable working with one another.
And I think Secretary Babbitt saw that there was a reasonable group o f people that, with a
little prodding, could perhaps move something through Congress.” Smith also thought
that Babbitt’s patience with the course o f the legislation may have stemmed from an even
more basic human level, his friendship with Governor Kitzhaber. “I think the governor
probably—and Peter might know better than I—but the governor probably reassured the
secretary that we ought to give this a try.”
“Absolutely,” agreed Peter Green, who is Governor Kitzhaber’s forestry advisor
and staff member who deals with public lands. I was lucky enough to comer both Green
and Smith together in Portland in early November, after the legislation had been signed
by the president. During the Steens process, Peter Green and Kevin Smith had worked as
a tag team: Green was on the ground in Oregon, negotiating with environmentalists,
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ranchers, and local government while Smith had day-to-day access to congressional
members and their staff in Washington. Both worked continuously, prodding the
negotiations along. “I’ll just echo what Kevin said,” Green continued. “Babbitt did it
this way in Oregon, because he could. There were times when the governor reassured
him, and there’s a lot o f mutual respect there, that this could be done.” But Green also
speculated that doing it “this way in Oregon” had to be put in a larger context. There was
motivation to show that, through cooperative effort, things could happen in the Clinton
administration. “I hope this doesn’t sound cynical, but I think that because there were
these other monuments going on, the administration had to show that there were ways to
protect land without invoking the Antiquities Act.”
Others have thought the same and not disqualified their opinion as cynical.
Harney County Commissioner Dan Nichols guessed, “Secretary Babbitt—this is purely
speculation—decided they better pick one spot, and let one local community come up
with some valid options to save the administration’s face politically.”
Still others said working to avoid monument designation was purely practical.
The BLM’s Bums District Field Manager; Miles Brown, feels that the amount o f private
land on the mountain automatically makes things different. When the administration
looked at that land and saw that it had “over half o f all the streams, meadows, and prime
habitat, they knew that just declaring a monument may not be the way to go,” he said.
But many hold a more optimistic view. Not only are there “conservationminded,” politically savvy ranchers like Stacy Davies on the mountain, but there is a long
history o f cooperation and collaboration. And if Sybil Ackerman was right when she told
me, “I think Babbitt cares about these collaborative processes,” then he must have had
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reason to think that it could really work, and for the best, at Steens. Even Nichols admits
that, because o f continued collaborative efforts on the mountain, the secretary may have
been willing to stick his neck out to allow Oregonians to work through a process. An
established constituency already existed. It wasn’t hard to get people involved in what
everyone considered to be the crown jewel o f southeastern Oregon. And the first people
Babbitt asked to tackle some o f the toughest questions about the management of the
mountain were part o f the Southeast Oregon Resource Advisory Committee.
Resource Advisory Councils (RACs) were established in August 1995 to provide
the public an opportunity to advise both the Bureau o f Land Management and the U.S.
Forest Service on a broad array o f resource issues facing the agencies.
The Bums District, which encompasses Steens Mountain, is served by the Southeastern
Oregon Resource Advisory Council (SEORAC). According to the BLM, the RACs
operate on principles o f collaboration and consensus. “Council members are sought who
are committed to working with other interests for the long-term benefit o f public land and
national forests” (BLM 2001). Each council is made up o f fifteen members representing
a wide array o f interests: commodity, environmental and resource conservation, and other
governmental organizations (Native American tribes, state and local governments, and
academicians involved in natural sciences). Miles Brown approached the SEORAC and
asked the group to consider future management on the mountain. The members accepted
the challenge and tackled the issue through extensive discussion and debate among
themselves as well as public meetings in Bend and Frenchglen. But the culmination o f
the group’s effort was a report recommending no changes on the mountain.
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Mike Golden flipped through the RAC report, which had been completed m
October o f 1999. “When Secretary Babbitt first came out,” Golden looked up and said,
“he asked us to put this RAC report together on the Steens. But when we took the
information back to him, the recommendation in the report was for no legislation on
Steens Mountain.” In a letter accompanying the RAC report, Golden wrote “the
subcommittee witnessed essentially two conflicting points o f view during its public
hearings and in the end, as individual RAC members tried to represent the views o f their
constituencies, we reflected those differences in our own deliberations.” In the short six
months they had to deliberate, the RAC determined that current management programs
were working on the mountain and recommended that there should be no designation o f a
national park or monument. The members could not agree to support legislative
designation as a national conservation area either. Instead, they left open the option for a
cooperative management program on the mountain and encouraged the formation o f a
broad-based management team o f users and landowners.
That didn’t fly with Babbitt. Golden said that the Secretary told him that even
though the RAC didn’t want legislation, legislation had to be a part o f the proposal. At
that point, Babbitt decided that the real stakeholders needed to get around the table in
order to make a deal—meaning, essentially, the landowners and conservationists. So the
Secretary asked Golden if he would chair the Steens Working Group (SWG)—put
together by Golden, Representative Walden, Senator Smith, and Governor Kitzhaber. He
agreed, and the group o f six representatives (environmental, ranching, RAC, tribal, local
government, and recreation) were given two months to develop recommendations for
legislative concepts regarding Steens Mountain. They were asked to concentrate on
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issues that the SEORAC could not address or reach a decision on. “Keep in mind,”
Golden said, “we were tackling questions that nobody else could come up with answers
to.”
Strength often lies in diversity, and from the outset, the Steens Working Group
seemed to represent a wide array o f interests. Yet, according to some, the group suffered
from artificial construction. Because participating members were appointed, biases were
embedded in the process. “When we got to the environmental community, we pushed for
several people,” Mike Golden told me. “But Representative Walden’s office said
absolutely we will not accept Bill Marlett, and we won’t accept Andy Kerr. They put
their foot down.” Though Marlett has been perhaps the most active environmentalist on
the Steens issue, it was felt that he would never come to a compromise. This belief may
have seemed accurate at the time. When I talked to Marlett shortly after the SWG
produced its final report in January, 2000,1 asked him what he thought about
collaboration. He responded, quietly and firmly, “I think it’s a waste o f time. It’s just
not that productive. Litigation is the only form where we have been able to level the
playing field.” Nonetheless, Marlett said if given the opportunity, he would have sat
down at the table.
As it turned out, that was exactly what was needed. And it is exactly what
happened—eventually. The Steens Working Group might have benefited from the
process o f working through Marlett’s strongly held beliefs—or compromise may have
become even more unattainable. At any rate, both he and Andy Kerr ended up
counseling Sybil Ackerman, the designated environmental representative, every night
after the group met.
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Ackerman described feeling isolated at the table. She asserted that the
representation sounded like a good balance, but the recreation representative wasn’t
environmental at all. “He represented the ORV people,” she said. “They could have just
as easily let the Sierra Club represent recreation and Oregon Natural Desert Association
represent the environmentalists. It would have created a better balance.” It’s safe to say
that the Sierra Club is as much an environmental organization as it is a backpacker’s club,
but it’s also easy to imagine that Ackerman is not exaggerating her situation. It must
have been difficult at the table, surrounded by a Harney County Commissioner, a
representative for the Oregon Hunters’ Association, a rancher—everyone except
Ackerman was from central or southeast Oregon, and to some degree, sympathetic to
local needs. “In these groups,” she told me, “it’s important to have two people back each
other up.”
As it stands, the Working Group report reflects the extreme polarization that took
place. Instead o f reaching consensus on any o f the issues (which included the boundary,
wilderness, grazing, development, transportation and access, and recreation), the group
produced several alternatives. In most cases, Ackerman stood alone behind each o f her
proposals. Even without Marlett, there was no compromise. The most graphic
representation o f this is the boundary issue. The report presented four different
alternatives for the Steens legislative boundary, ranging from Ackerman’s environmental
proposal at 1,202,930 acres (including 263,410 acres private land) to Davies’ landowner
proposal at 33,199 acres (0 acres private land).
“Sybil and the cowboys each drew their line in the sand, and we almost didn’t
have another meeting,” Golden explained. When it came time to discuss the boundary,
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Stacy Davies put the 33,000-acre boundary down, and Ackerman laid her 1.2 millionacre boundary on the table. “And you would expect some negotiation,” said Davies. But
according to Davies, Ackerman never decreased the size o f her boundary, even as others
increased theirs. The issue became gridlocked. “At that point, the rest o f it was a waste
o f time. What it turned out to be from then on was an avenue to get your idea to the
secretary in writing, and that’s where it stayed,” Davies explained.
“I wasn’t going to come to anything less than Babbitt was asking for,” Ackerman
said, and Davies describes her position in the same way: The environmentalists drew the r
biggest boundary they felt they could justify and stayed there. “They played the politics
out and said Babbitt is willing to go to 1.2 million acres. They were in no position to
negotiate at all, and so it put us in the position o f just give, give, give,” Davies
complained. He felt that the environmentalists stood to win whether a successful
compromise was reached or not.

Many months after the SWG process, I sat stiffly on a velvet couch in Dan
Nichols’ Victorian parlor—inside a house that belonged to his wife’s family for four
generations. I had missed his driveway in the dark, drove miles beyond the town of
Diamond before realizing it, and showed up almost an hour late. It felt awkward
invading his private space at such an hour. The windows were thrown open to let in a
cool October night. An intricately carved banister led up winding stairs. The wallpaper
filled the dimly lit room with antique flower patterns. The county commissioner before
me might have been a member o f the first generation that lived in this house, with his
handlebar moustache, closely cropped hair, neat-fitting button down shirt, and boots.
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Nichols was a member o f the Steens Working Group and expressed appreciation for
Babbitt creating it and allowing him to participate. But he was frustrated at the lack o f
consensus and what he saw as Sybil Ackerman’s lack o f cooperation. He looked straight
at me, unwavering, and said, ‘There were five people who basically agreed on a concept,
and one individual kept saying, ‘No, can’t go there.’ Repeatedly stated, ‘No, can’t do
that. No, can’t go there.’ We were initially selected to go in and give and take, come up
with a compromise. And ‘no, can’t go there’ isn’t even remotely a compromising
position.”
Many observers speculated that environmentalists were playing the situation to
their advantage. Lack o f consensus in the Working Group meant it might be tougher to
reach consensus as a bill was drafted and negotiated. If the legislative effort proved
unsuccessful, then Babbitt might have to demonstrate that his threats were not idle and
unleash the Antiquities Act. And a national monument is what environmentalists had
been calling for, and what locals feared the most, all along.
Part o f the issue, according to Miles Brown, was that no one really wanted to lay
all their cards on the table. “Because once you did, those cards would never come o ff the
table. Everybody knows what you’re willing to give.” But after the SWG process failed
to reach consensus, the ranchers—through Representative Walden—would lay their
biggest card on the table: a cattle-free wilderness. That one act changed the entire
process, including environmentalists’ commitment to negotiation.
Yet during the SWG talks, all o f this was hidden. Given such circumstances,
combined with an inadequate period o f time to work in, it is no wonder that the Steens
Working Group was unsuccessful in coming up with a cohesive management plan. In the
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end, it is hard to say that the locals were allowed a fair shot at involvement. Any sort o f
collaborative effort was denied organic origins, an ability to grow from the ground up.
People came to the table for different reasons; they did not have to struggle through their
differences in order to address a common problem. The playing field was not level. This
brings Babbitt’s “kinder approach” into question. How can collaboration work when it’s
mandated, when it originates from the top and is pushed down and, subsequently,
becomes fragmented at the community level? Can it even be considered collaboration at
all? It is a question I shall come back to— a question that dominates the framework o f the
process, encompasses the plot o f the story, and upon which almost everyone had an
opinion.

In March, I asked Golden what has happened since the Steens Working Group
handed in its final report in January 2000. He looked suddenly exasperated. “Once we
walked out o f the door after our meeting with the Secretary—and with their promises to
keep us informed and thanking us for what we did there—nobody has said one word to us
or let us know what’s going to happen,” he said. “And the BLM in Bums is calling me
and asking if I’ve heard anything . . . I don’t know where they are, and I don’t know what
the conflicts are.”
When I posed the same question to Bill Marlett—again, this was six months
before the final agreement came together—he said he hadn’t heard much besides rumors.
“What I do know is they’re not reaching consensus very quickly. And that’s fine with us.
Any consensus reached with Gordon Smith and Greg Walden is not going to be good for
the mountain. We’d rather see a monument. We won’t get any wilderness, but that’s
fine.”
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VII

A Balance of Power
Little did Marlett know, but by the end o f the summer 2000, he would be working
towards that very consensus with those Oregon Republicans and ranchers. There came a
point in the deliberations when environmentalists realized that they might get something
more through a legislative process. “How do you reconcile that they [the ranchers] were
afraid o f a national monument, and they feel like they got something better—and yet we
feel that we got something better than a national monument?’ asked Andy Kerr. The
designation o f Steens Mountain as a national monument would certainly set some
boundaries as to what activities could or couldn’t take place. It would provide a higher
level o f protection and preservation than the current management o f the land. But many
o f the important details would be left to a management plan—ultimately written by the
BLM. Environmentalists began to wonder if they might have more say if they
participated in the writing o f the legislation, instead o f fighting it.
When a draft o f the bill began circulating early that summer—a draft that
included large tracts of designated wilderness, part o f it cattle-free, and massive land
trades (possibilities that weren’t even discussed by the Steens Working Group)—the
Steens-Alvord Coalition, a consortium o f state, local, and national environmental groups,
knew that it might be worth their time to consider the bill. Importantly, environmentalists
would continue to hold a position o f power—the ability to negotiate for more and stall or
even kill the bill if they were unhappy. “One phone call from me or a letter from the
coalition to the delegation would have killed this bill flat,” declared Bill Marlett. “O f
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course,” he admitted, “the same holds true from the ranchers. They could have done the
same thing.”
Congressman Walden and his constituents in the ranchers did hold that same
power, along with another. They had made the wise move to develop legislation that
looked better to conservationists than a monument. They had set an enticing table.
When it began to look like the Steens Working Group would fail, Representative
Walden, Lindsay Slater, and other staff members, along with Stacy Davies and other
ranchers, began to quietly piece together a proposal. “We started the first draft,” Lindsay
Slater, Walden’s legislative assistant (now Chief o f Staff for Representative Mike
Simpson o f Idaho), told me in a phone conversation from his Washington D.C. office.
“And we went to Mr. DeFazio first with it—for the wilderness and cow free wilderness.
And we just started pitching it very slowly to try to get people to take us seriously. And
once we had a little buy in, we started writing the bill.” The bill became the template that
people worked from through July. During that time, it was subject to continual
reworking, a flurry o f endless phone conversations, faxes, weekly meetings, and constant
checking between politicians and their constituencies.
The field o f players broadened substantially: Babbitt’s staff Governor
Kitzhaber’s office, Senator Wyden and his aides, Representative DeFazio, Representative
Blumenauer. Everybody wanted something—something altered, something included,
something deleted. Legislative staff and the governor’s staff would take responsibility
for different elements—the boundary, wilderness, development. Peter Green, Governor
Kitzhaber’s forestry advisor, explained, “They would go to each o f us and ask what we
needed. And w e’d argue for months for more development language . . . and then they’d
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go to Wyden, and Wyden was arguing for more wilderness so they had to give, give,
give.”
Stacy Davies expressed frustration with these compromises: “We’d negotiate with
Bill Marlett and Andy Kerr, and then the Sierra Club and Audubon Society would come
and want something. And so you’d give them what they wanted, and then the national
Wilderness Society, national Sierra Chib would come and want something. And then the
governor would come and want something, and Representative Miller out of California
would come and want something, and so we ran out o f things to give.”
That giving was inevitable, according to Green and Smith, because Walden’s
office developed the first draft. “When you do that, everybody is going to take shots at
it,” said Smith. “And if it doesn’t include everything that other people want, which o f
course it didn’t—there’s no way you can possibly do that—you reset the basic instrument
from which everybody is going to ask for changes.” If Wyden had come out with the
first draft, with a huge wilderness overlay, it would have been “cutting away in reverse.”
According to these two members o f Kitzhaber’s staff, the biggest mistakes
Walden made were not negotiating with everyone at once, and, more importantly,
excluding the environmentalists until almost August. “And we, o f course, kept saying
you need to talk to them. Eventually they went to talk to them and had to give, give, give
again,” explained Green. “What did they think they were going to do, just agree to it?’
Needless to say, they didn’t. There was much opposition to the bill introduced by
Congressmen Walden and Blumenauer to the House Committee on Resources and
Committee on Agriculture on July 12, 2000. Members from other states were doubtful.
National environmental groups had substantial concerns. And to make matters worse,
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there was little support from conservationists and the delegation at home. Though
Wyden and DeFazio spoke o f their conceptual support o f the legislation, they said
changes would be necessary in order to gain their full support. It soon became obvious
the bill had a low probability o f passing. Babbitt continued to rattle his saber. Across the
West, the list o f monuments was growing.
‘The bill, as introduced, sucked,” wrote Kerr in a letter to his constituents. “It
had numerous provisions that were not supportable in any form, including exceptions to
the Wilderness Act and other bad things.” Those “bad things,” according to the
environmentalists, included a purpose statement that did not ensure conservation as the
primary and overriding purpose, unacceptable language regarding juniper management in
wilderness and wilderness study areas, and the compensation o f private landowners for
non-development easements. These and other provisions were eventually eliminated,
compromises that were disheartening to ranchers. But, echoing Green and Smith’s
sentiment, Marlett explained, “the fact is, it was their bill, it was their design. . . they
were the ones that set up the board upon which we played this game. They set the bar,
not us, and our job was to raise that bar.” Conservationists did raise it, but not without
some give and take— and not as the bill had been negotiated before. A core group o f four
people pounded out a deal behind closed doors. Stacy Davies explained how it came
about:
“Then finally, late August, we got close enough that— I don’t even know how it
happened but, they made Bill Marlett, Andy Kerr, and Fred and I get in a room together
and hammer it out. Finalize it.”
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“We had to have people there that could make a decision on the spot. And it was
good. It’s amazing how far Fred Otley and Bill Marlett can get drinking beer in front of
the truck,” commented Lindsay Slater.
“People who had been excluded from the working group last December because
they couldn’t get along, suddenly they were closing the deal. There’s a lesson right there
. . . They came back and there was this new map. And people were liking the bill,”
recalled Peter Green.
Many o f those I talked to saw, in retrospect, the whole process as leading up to
the negotiations among these four. Bill Marlett and Andy Kerr were previously excluded
from the discussions—could only comment on what was previously discussed—because
o f their uncompromising reputations. Maybe it was because time was running out.
Maybe there was too much at stake to let the effort die. But with occasional assistance
from Lindsay Slater, Senator Wyden’s Bend field representative David Blair, and the
BLM’s Miles Brown, these men quickly struck a balance o f power that carried the
legislation to a unanimous voice vote on the House floor.
“If you look at it,” suggested Miles Brown, “it’s just a progression o f getting
closer and closer to the real people that needed to be involved to make a deal. You
evolve from the Southeast Oregon Resource Management Plan, where we [the agency]
gather information and go into a black box, and then we come back out and everybody
pukes all over it. You go from that end o f it, and then you gravitate to the RAC, which
gets a little closer, but there’s still outside folks. And then you go to the Steens Working
Group, which got a little closer. And then you go to Washington and set some
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sideboards. And then you get to the real deal makers, and that was Andy and Bill and
Stacy and Fred.”
One o f reasons the negotiations worked so well was because o f the mixed
chemistry o f their personalities, which brought the legislation down to a very human
level.
Fred Otley: funny, easy-going, experienced in political matters, a fourth
generation rancher at Steens. “Fred Otley is the old family,” said Miles Brown. He held
a strong and ongoing trust from the ranchers.
Stacy Davies: charismatic, quick-witted, with a capacity for remembering the
smallest o f details. Davies had the backing o f the Sanders family, millionaires who gave
him the freedom and trust to do what was best for the Roaring Springs Ranch—the
largest on the mountain. “Stacy was key,” explained Brown. “Stacy Davies has a way o f
relating to a lot o f different people . . . And he’s one o f those people—their ranch is
willing to mature, they’re willing to change, and he’s kind o f led the way on that.” Three
years before, Davies put together a conservation agreement with the U.S. Fish and
Wildlife Service and BLM on Roaring Springs. The community was skeptical. But he
proved a rancher could work with federal agencies.
“Stacy would come and he knew exactly what the situation was, and he’s just
boom, boom, boom, boom, go down the line and lay it out on the line,” recalled Otley.
“And that saved the bill, ahh, so many times because o f his capacity to cut out all the
excess crap and focus on the achievable, fundamental things that were fair.”
Bill Marlett: serious, relentless, detail-oriented. Marlett brought an intimate
knowledge o f the mountain and the buy-in o f the local environmental community. Inch-
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for-inch, pound-for-pound, Marlett moved up and down the map, gaining wilderness by
40 acres here and there.
“Sometime you just had to walk away while Bill sat there negotiating acre-byacre on the map. The rest o f us had to go out and smoke cigarettes on the porch and take
a break,” explained Brown.
N

Andy Kerr: respected lobbyist on the national and state level, one o f Oregon’s
best-known environmentalists, self-assured to the point some might call egotistical.
Miles Brown called him “the spin doctor,” and, in contrast to Marlett, “out there in the
big concept stuff.” Otley observed that “he wasn’t so worried about the technical details
and he knew what he wanted.” Brown stressed the importance of his credibility: “If
Andy Kerr says it’s good, then people believe it’s good. If Andy Kerr goes back to
Washington and talks to congressionals and says this is a good thing, they’re going to
listen to him.”
“Andy, he’s an interesting character,” observed Fred Otley. “At least he
accurately portrays himself. He says he’s arrogant and hateful and loves to make people
mad. And he said, ‘This is the first time I’ve been nice to you guys and it probably won’t
happen again.’”
It just worked. They were the people that mattered. They built a certain level o f
trust. They even joked. And they were able to negotiate directly rather than rely on
politicians’ aides to broker a deal.
I asked Peter Green what he thought o f the personality dynamics o f these four
men. I explained what I had heard about the intense negotiations and the equipoise that
somehow emerged.
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“I like what you say, it’s kind o f like the Beatles,” Green admitted, though he had
a different take. “But what I would say is that I’m not so sure they were so important in
the room. They were the perfect combination to bring in the needed constituencies . . .
because they brought the right people to bear, they needed to be in on that deal. You see
the subtle difference I’m talking about?’
I did, but also figured one element was an integral part o f the other. And then I
started thinking how all the pieces somehow fell together—at every level. There was a
Democratic administration that wanted some sort o f special designation and brought the
threat o f a monument. There was a Republican Congress that wouldn’t pass a bill that
didn’t have the support o f the landowners. A Republican congressman from Oregon—a
minority in his state—introduced the bill. Environmentalists, the Democratic governor,
and the rest o f the Oregon Democratic delegation were able to balance the legislation out
and make it credible. Everything ripened at once.
“In the end,” Lindsay Slater told me, “everybody was fighting for the bill, which
was really nice. There was finally a point where I felt like, wow, now everybody is on
our side fighting for this thing, rather than trying to kill it to get a monument. When I
reached that point I knew we were going to get it.”
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VIII
What They Could Not Walk Away From

From the top o f the cirque, the track o f the glacier is obvious. The U-shaped
gorge heads north and then swings gently to the left. The glacier scraped through the
land 10,000 years ago. The floor, splashed golden by aspen and cottonwood clinging to
the creek and springs, is nearly a half-mile below. Only the sky demarcates the clean,
concave walls o f the gorge, brushed by erosion with faint lines that trace the wind and
rain and gravity’s path.
Kiger Gorge is one of Steens’ most famous. The view from the top, accessible by
car from the Steens Mountain Loop Road, is a physical lesson in the processes of
geologic time and the movement o f glaciers. Pictures o f Kiger in the spring and early
summer show the gorge softened with green and wildflowers. But when I first looked
upon it in the beginning o f October, the Kiger Gorge was stripped by the heat o f summer,
a rocky bowl tilted high in the desert. I quickly left the few late-season tourists at the
pullout and interpretive sign and hiked towards the gorge’s famous notch—the
mountain’s most distinguishing feature when viewed from the wildlife refuge. Following
the edge o f a grassy headland, I scrambled up a ridge toward the eastern wall—relishing
the opportunity to climb in a rocky, steep, exposed place. Locals call Kiger’s notch the
gunsight, and when I sat within its frame, it seemed that I rode the great divide the
mountain slices through the Oregon desert.
The flat, dry basin lay to the east; the curved plateau and hidden valleys o f the
mountain rolled to the west. The Alvord Basin sank below the mountain like an empty
bathtub, the remnants o f its once full prehistoric lake, now a dry, cracked, and vast
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playa—the color o f milky tea. Even the horizon took on the dusty tones o f the desert,
diluted by the heat o f the land. Mann Lake formed an anomalous figure against the floor;
from my vantage point it formed a puddle o f forgiving blue that caught snowmelt o ff the
steep eastern escarpment o f Steens. To the northwest, I could see further up the gorge,
into the bend forced by the glacier and out to where it spilled open at the Diamond
Valley. I had camped there the night before on Fred Otley’s ranch. Otley felt that the
view o f Kiger Gorge rivaled that o f the Grand Canyon. But he was admittedly biased.
The headwaters o f Kiger belonged to his family for generations—until they traded it
away at the bargaining table only weeks earlier.
“That land we’re giving up is where all the kids shot their first elk. It’s our
favorite part o f the ranch,” he said the previous afternoon. “I’m not sure how many years
it will take before we get used to that being gone.”
“Do you have any idea why you decided to do it in the end?’ I asked. We sat on a
hot afternoon in the coolness o f his parents’ home. Almost every inch o f the walls were
covered by photos o f children, grandchildren, nephews, and nieces, who, at various
points in their lives, inevitably donned cowboy hats. Otley had been late to meet me, and
to compensate he brought a case o f beer. I didn’t object. We talked for a couple o f hours
over cold PBR, which, on that dusty, sweltering Friday, tasted about perfect.
“There were two things,” Otley explained. “We put something there that would
give us a possibility o f a piece o f legislation that would avoid a massive monument,
which would effectively destroy everything that we’ve worked for so many years. A
monument would have created a war zone.”

72

The land his family has loved is primarily concentrated in the Diamond Valley. It
first became familiar to them in 1886, when Fred Otley’s great-grandfather—also named
Fred Otley—an accountant and raft man on the Mississippi, moved out west for the
health o f his wife, who was sick with tuberculosis. Though she died in California shortly
thereafter, Otley headed north to Malheur Lake, put a cattle operation together, and
finished raising a family.
“It [the ranch] evolved as it was put together—a number o f places over many
years—and actually moved to this site in 1943 . . . At one point there were actually seven
Otley families. They all had boys. Girls weren’t allowed into the scenario o f things, I
guess,” he said wryly and grinned at me. “Two families, seven boys. And the next
generation had all boys too. We kind o f broke down last generation and let a girl or two
crowd in,” he laughed.
The Otley family amassed about 10,000 acres o f private land over the years, but
that accounted for only half o f their operation. The other 50 percent was made up o f
public land grazing allotments. The Otleys became prominent figures throughout the
community and within the industry. The gold and silver inscribed belt buckle Otley wore
that day attested to the fact that he served for a time as president o f the Oregon
Cattlemen’s Association, a powerful lobbying force in the state. Otley has also been
involved in the special designation issue at Steens for years, heading up a local group
called Friends o f Steens Mountain and serving as private landowner liaison to the
Resource Advisory Council.
The land trades, o f which the Kiger Gorge was only a part, were a key and
controversial part o f the legislation. “We offered our land as icing on the cake to try to
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get this bill passed,” explained Otley. “We will probably get used to and enjoy the fact
that certain o f our pastures will no longer be a combination o f public and private land,
and that there’s a dry part o f our ranch where w e’re going to be able to develop water.
And w e’re going to be able to implement a prescribed fire management plan without the
government having to OK everything. So there’s certain inherent, tangible positives that
we’re going to incur.” Still, Otley said he and his family w e’re having a hard time
balancing those positives with the loss o f Kiger Gorge.
Most environmentalists felt the exchanges were the bargaining chip that kept the
ranchers at the table. “Some o f these ranchers were smart enough to figure out that their
fixture was not in public lands grazing,” said Andy Kerr. “What is good for these land
barons is that they made out fine. They were very fairly compensated for these lands.
And they’re in a much better position to go about their grazing on private lands with less
interference from the public.” But environmentalists may have wanted those trades just
as badly, if not more. Consolidating the high alpine, ecologically sensitive areas made
sense from a conservation standpoint. “I’m not sure the bill would have gone through if
there wasn’t a land trade,” said the BLM’s Miles Brown. “What you really got out o f this
bill is, one, you got wilderness designation, and the big thing the environmental
community got—particularly ONDA—was a 95 percent cow-free Donner und Blitzen
watershed. That’s what they’ve been after for a long time. To get that, you needed to
remove the private land.”
That high-elevation, highly sensitive land, that grass that greens up after July, was
the point around which negotiations revolved. The areas were key pieces to the ranchers’
successful operation. But once they decided to let some o f it go, Fred Otley and Stacy
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Davies knew they had offered something that conservationists would have a hard time
walking away from; they knew it was their best hope against a national monument
designation. Any monument boundary would have encompassed quite a bit o f private
ground in the high country, and some landowners had threatened to fence, develop, and,
at minimum, forever retain that important land if they were forcibly enclosed by such
administrative lines. “We made it clear that if a monument occurred, it wasn’t going to
happen. It wouldn’t be on the table again,” explained Otley. “The acquiring o f those
special lands, Ankle and Mud Creek, the head o f Kiger, were not going to the public, not
going to the government. No way. It was kind o f a one shot deal. We were willing to
put ‘er up if everybody played fair. They weren’t going to have a second shot at it.”
The July bill circulating in the House o f Representatives outlined six different
land exchanges— including the Otley’s property in the Kiger, portions o f Roaring Springs
Ranch, and some property owned by the Witzels. But H.R. 4828 was receiving tentative
support from many members o f Congress as well as environmentalists. Support for the
land exchanges, specifically, was even shakier. It was not until those focused
negotiations described earlier—not until Davies, Otley, Marlett, and Kerr sat down and
started pouring over maps and adjusting boundaries by 40 acres here and there—that the
controversial elements o f the bill started to congeal into something passable. The right
people were at the table and, as Kerr put it, able to “deliver” to their constituencies.
Fred Otley felt this bargaining was necessary and complimented Kerr and Marlett
for their work. “The congressional folks’ support was somewhat tentative because o f the
land ratios. And Andy and Bill did a good job o f going out there and looking at public
values and then negotiating whether what we put on the table in terms o f land
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exchanges—and the public values that would be lost from the lands we would receive—
was balanced. And they worked very hard at it, and I think it was fair and accurate.”
Whether those exchanges really were balanced was heavily disputed. At first
glance, the bare bones o f dollars and acreage made the trades look heavily skewed in
favor o f the ranchers. Some even suggested that the public was being ripped off. In the
end, Roaring Springs Ranch traded away 10,909 acres in exchange for 76,374 acres of
public land and received $2,889,000 “to compensate for lost productivity and economic
activity caused by the dislocation and reallocation o f resources and the disruption and
termination o f traditional management techniques,” according to the bill that passed the
House o f Representatives (U.S. House 2000a). Charlie Otley, Fred Otley’s uncle, traded
851 acres o f his land in the Kiger Gorge for 3,845 acres o f low-lying areas and received
$920,000 for economic adjustments. The Otley Brothers, Inc., Fred Otley’s outfit,
received 6,881 acres in the Diamond Valley and $400,000 in exchange for his 505 acres
in Kiger. Two other ranches together received approximately $950,000 in economic
adjustments and 17,000 acres o f public land for about 6,400 acres o f their private land on
the mountain.
Money wasn’t the important issue to Andy Kerr and Bill Marlett. “In twenty
years, nobody is going to remember $5 million in payments, but they will remember that
this was the first designated cow-free wilderness area in the West. That’s what matters,”
opined Marlett. To him, creating a cattle-free wilderness produced a value that couldn’t
be bought or sold on the marketplace.
Nonetheless, there were quite a few skeptics. Dick Vander Schafif, Senior
Conservation Planner with The Nature Conservancy in Portland, explained that the basic
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controversy regarding the exchanges were the cash settlement payments made to the
ranchers to cover their economic losses. “The private and federal lands were exchanged
on an equal market basis (even this is disputable), but then there were cash payments
added on top o f this exchange deal to cover ranchers’ losses that resulted from high
elevation private lands (late season forage) going out o f private ownership in exchange
for low elevation (early season forage) federal lands.”
Critics continued to ask, why such weighted ratios? Why the extra money piled
on top o f the exchanges? “We took a lot o f shit from our constituents from the net loss o f
public lands,” Andy Kerr told me in Portland. In September 2000, he sent out a general
email on an environmental list serv in order to clarify and justify the core negotiators’
approach. In the note to his colleagues, Kerr explained that the appraisal process was
expedited in order to keep time with the dynamic and evolving nature o f the legislation.
And, instead o f going through a traditional appraisal process, the lands to be acquired
were evaluated at their development value—because serious development potential
existed.
“For the most part, conservationists get up every morning to protect values that
the market doesn’t well, fairly, or adequately recognize. While there is obvious value in
cow-free (and other) wilderness, in the improvement o f sage grouse and redband trout
habitat by the elimination o f livestock, and in the prevention o f trophy homes at the head
o f Kiger Gorge, the traditional appraisal process doesn’t take them into account,” he
wrote.
Stacy Davies explained the trades another way: “You have an appraised value,
and nothing on the open market ever trades for an appraised value. You have a market
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value, and market value is whatever you’re willing to pay, and I’m willing to sell. And
what happened on Steens is a combination o f both. You’re dealing with priceless pieces
o f land. Charlie Otley could have said the Kiger Gorge is worth $5,000 an acre, and I
guarantee in ten years he’d get that. He sold it for $1300 an acre to the government. . .
Basically, what it had to boil down to is that you had a rough appraisal done to say that
we’re in the ball park. And then you had competent people on both sides that negotiated
the deal—they cut a deal. And beyond that, what can you really do 7 ’
Consider, as well, that private land in terms o f those grazing leases, which had
been capitalized into the value o f the property. Consider the fact that ranchers were
“technically” losing money on their private land with the loss o f public AUMs created by
a cattle-free wilderness. Although this might seem like a strange and circuitous line o f
reasoning, it is a part o f ranching economics. Framed in this way, the weighted land
ratios and economic adjustment make a little more sense.
Nonetheless, the economic adjustments to the ranchers were the hardest sell
outside o f the negotiation process. But the environmentalists at the table understood that
the ranchers would not trade without them. By giving up their late-summer forage in the
higher elevations, the landowners incurred replacement costs—such as constructing water
developments to mimic high mountain meadows. Andy Kerr thought the compensation
entirely appropriate and “both socially just and politically necessary, if the legislation
[was] to be enacted into law.”
Fred Otley and Stacy Davies told me it was not only appropriate, it was absolutely
necessary. They would have had to pull the trades off the table without economic
mitigation. The money was needed to revamp and make possible an economically viable
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operation. That might mean drilling a well, putting in a pivot, pumping the water, and
creating manmade meadows; installing new fence; figuring in reduced carrying capacity;
and finding ways to cope with the increased costs and decreased weight o f their calves.
According to Otley, his calves make about 3.75 pounds per day on the high Steens in
August, while a cow will gain from lA a pound to V* a pound in the low country. After the
trades and the cattle-free designation, his company lost 504 o f those high country AUMS.
He estimated this loss to equal $60,000 per year just in weight gains.
“If you’re looking at long-term, sustainable ranches, the thing that’s kept these
ranches is the elevation—winter grazing to good summer grazing. It’s still green up
high,” Stacy Davies told me in the beginning o f October. “Our cows that aren’t grazing
the high country are thin and have light calves. They didn’t breed. But we had fifteen
head up there this year. I brought them down the other day, and their calves are weighing
over 600 pounds. And the cows are fat. . . The expensive part o f a ranch is your winter
feed. From a dollar input standpoint. But what makes you money is your summer feed.”
Andy Kerr and Bill Marlett accepted this. In their eyes, the costs o f the
exchanges— less public land, a gross reduction in sage grouse habitat— were outweighed
by the gains—more public land without livestock and a net gain for sage grouse habitat
(ecologically important land was gained in the endangered mountain big sagebrush zone).
The land up high was simply more valuable than the land down low—much o f which had
already been heavily grazed, plowed, and planted. “There’s a net loss o f public lands, but
there’s a net gain for the public interest, I would argue,” said Kerr. “We got cow-free
wilderness, we got better habitat for sage grouse. If you want to look at it from a sage
grouse, from a redband trout, from a big horn sheep perspective---those species are better
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o ff as a result o f these exchanges and the subsequent legislation.” Because o f this, Kerr
and Marlett felt the landowners weren’t benefiting unjustly at the expense of the public.
But there still remained the sticky issue o f California’s Democratic Congressman
George Miller, who wouldn’t be satisfied just because a couple o f ranchers and
environmentalists hammered out a deal that made both parties happy. Miller, the ranking
Democratic member in the House Resources Committee, had just got hold o f a recent
General Accounting Office report, which stated that taxpayers rarely get their money’s
worth from land swaps. His presence became felt during the crafting o f the bill, even
though he wasn’t in the room with the delegation and the governor.
It took the support o f the entire Oregon delegation to sway him. According to
Kevin Smith, Representative Peter DeFazio became the lynchpin in moving Miller to a
place where the bill would be acceptable to a major block o f votes on the House floor.
And Governor Kitzhaber and other Oregon Democrats reassured the California
congressman that even though the overall public benefit was financially hard to quantify,
ecologically, the land trades gave back much more than would have been received
otherwise. The economic adjustments were only a minor debt in comparison to the value
o f the high Steens.
In the end, both Peter Green and Kevin Smith felt that that the land exchanges
were the strongest result o f the negotiation. “This isn’t going to get pulled apart because
o f these land exchanges,” commented Green. “To me, this is a model because you’ve
done two things. One, you’ve come to a place where there’s an agreement on the
stalemate. But you’ve also rearranged all the pieces so that it can’t fall apart in seven
years. You put the private land down low, where it’s not important ecologically, and you
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put the public land up high. You solve the long-term problem. And you've come to some
d eal. . . And that’s why I think it’s so exciting; it’s resilient. It’s a model for doing
things the right way.”
Did the ranchers think so? I asked Lindsay Slater, Representative Walden’s aid
during the negotiations and legislative process. “I always said we were trading high
resource values—the pristine glacier meadows up top— for the low-lying cow values.
We’re getting the cows where they belong, and we’re locking up and blocking up the
high resource values on top,” he said. I asked him if the cattle industry was upset that the
legislation set a precedent with the first cattle-free wilderness. He answered my question
with another: “If you’re going to get. run off, do you want to get run off the land with
nothing to show for it?” Certainly, the ranchers were smart enough to bend without
breaking—survive the transitions o f a changing West and not walk away empty-handed.
Slater stressed that despite the fact that the ranchers will have to operate in a different
manner, they had established these ranches as economically viable units for years to
come. “We always said, the Congressman [Walden] always said, we will not put them in
a worse position than they are today with this.” Perhaps not a worse position, but
certainly a different position—still intact though less powerful.
In southeastern Oregon, grazing the high country is getting more difficult and less
profitable. Stacy Davies admitted this but said it wasn’t the only reason ranchers agreed
to the land exchanges. “Yeah, the writing is on the wall for public land grazing in highly
sensitive areas, and those restrictions are scaring us a little bit; but, at the same time,
there’s quite a spirit o f cooperation in it too.” He paused and looked straight at me.
“Quote me carefully, but you’ll never got most o f these guys to admit that. They didn’t
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want development in Kiger Gorge either. That underlying land ethic, each one o f us has
it, and we can’t really go to cattlemen’s meetings and say it. But it is there.”
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rx
Reconciling

A good friend o f mine was once lost driving in southeastern Oregon. He recalls
heading north out o f Winnemucca, Nevada, taking a picture of himself next to a
“Welcome to Oregon” sign, and then heading into a great unknown. Somehow, he says,
he ended up on Highway 205. After several hours, he vaguely remembers coming to a
crossroads: a dirt road peeled o ff towards the east, but he stuck to the pavement,
assuming it would take him to Lakeview. At midday he began to wonder why he hadn’t
arrived. The late June sun sat high, casting no shadow and providing him with little sense
o f direction. The landscape unrolled in endless sage and plateaus. The needle on his gas
gage hovered just above empty. He began to feel desperate. Suddenly, he crested a hill
overlooking two large, shallow lakes. When he reached the valley floor he noticed a
Malheur National Wildlife Refuge headquarters sign. “I have two questions,” he said
when he walked to the front desk. “Where am I, and do you have any gas?’ The man
chuckled, for he was still over thirty miles from the nearest gas station. Then he led him
to a couple o f huge metal gas tanks, flipped a switch, and waited for a pump to warm up.
As it turned out, my friend’s (many) wrong turns cost him an additional five hours of
driving. And he drove right past Steens Mountain without even knowing it.
“We’re pretty excited that we got a name long enough that you can’t put it on a
sign with an arrow pointing down the highway,” said Stacy Davies. The name, Steens
Mountain Cooperative Management and Protection Area, implies much. It reinforces
ranchers’ presence on the landscape, calls attention to their role in managing that
landscape, and recognizes that protection o f ecological values can exist alongside the
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existence o f historical uses. But many tourists won't know what to make o f it. It has no
precedent. It’s not a part o f any system, has no counterparts in other areas like national
parks, national monuments, even national conservation areas. “This weird Cooperative
Management and Protection Area—what the hell is that? It’s not a NCA,” complained
Andy Kerr when I talked with him in Portland. “It’s not only long and awkward, it also
suggests that Congress would be legislating an area more for a particular style o f
management than for the substance o f conserving and protecting unique natural values
for this and future generations,” he said while testifying to a House Resources
subcommittee the previous July.
Compromises. Trade-offs. Were the ranchers run off? Did conservationists lose
by giving up their dream o f 100 percent cattle-free public lands on the high mountain or
the inclusion o f the Alvord Desert? Or, rather, did both sides have the vision and grace to
seize a moment that might not come along again? People on either side o f the aisle are
quick to point out objectives lost, elements carefully crafted in pervious drafts that were
eventually discarded. It is impossible to entirely judge all o f the ramifications o f the act,
especially since many on-the-ground details will emerge with the management plan, a
document that will take a maximum o f four years to produce.
The legislation passed the House on the morning o f October 4,2001. I was
resting in the shade o f an old box elder by the ranch bunkhouse, reviewing interview
notes and watching warblers and wrens, when Alice Elshoff came running down the
driveway, clearly excited by the news she had just received. When I reached Roaring
Springs Ranch forty minutes later and related Elshoff s ebullience, Stacy Davies smiled,
but only a little. “If the radical environmental community is excited about it, that makes
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me nervous,” he said, though we both laughed. It was clear that passage o f the bill was a
good thing to him—he had invested so much time in it—but it was also bittersweet.
After all o f the compromises, he felt that ranchers were left with only a few core
consolations: “The only thing we ended up with was a 500,000-acre boundary instead o f
a 1.2 million-acre boundary. We ended up with a name that won’t draw people. And
we’re not sure they’re really a good deal, but we ended up with the land exchanges.” Of
course, the economic adjustments embedded in the land exchanges had to be good for the
ranchers as well.
As we talked more about the bill, we did come across other things that made him
happy: the Wildland Juniper Management Area, the Steens Mountain Advisory Council,
some o f the development language. And he did speak o f a certain humility he felt when
he watched the vote that morning on C-SPAN. “From a personal standpoint, having been
involved in something as detailed and huge as this—to think that you’ve been that
involved in it, and it actually went through the Untied States Congress, is pretty
humbling, really.” But it became clear to me that the legislation was not as much as he
hoped for; it was the lesser o f two evils. And he was not alone in this feeling. “It is
probably an accurate sentiment in the community,” David Blackstun related, “that as the
bill evolved, it has evolved and matured more in favor o f the environmental interests than
the ranchers.”
The purpose statement o f the act provides one overarching example o f this shift
towards environmental protection. When the legislation was first introduced, it read as
follows:
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The objectives for which the Cooperative Management and Protection Area is designated
are as follows:
(1) To maintain and enhance cooperative and innovative management practices between
public and private land managers in the Cooperative Management and Protection
Area
(2) To maintain the viability o f grazing and recreation operations on public and private
lands in the Cooperative Management and Protection Area
(3) To conserve, protect, and manage the long-term ecological health and functioning
watersheds o f Steens Mountain (U.S. House 2000b).

But environmental groups, especially national environmental groups, felt that protection
o f ecological resources had to be the guiding light for all management activities on the
mountain—in the event that any irreconcilable conflicts arose. In the final version o f the
bill, the act reads (U.S. House 2000a):
The purpose o f the Cooperative Management and Protection Area is
to conserve, protect, and manage the long-term ecological integrity of
Steens Mountain for future and present generations.
Then the objectives, which are subservient to the purpose, are listed in the following way:
♦ to maintain and enhance cooperative and innovative management projects, programs,
and agreements between tribal, public, and private interests in the Cooperative
Management and Protection Area;
♦ to promote grazing, recreation, historic, and other uses that are sustainable;
♦ to conserve, protect, and to ensure traditional access to cultural, gathering, religious,
and archaeological sites by the Bums Paiute Tribe on Federal lands and to promote
cooperation with private landowners;
♦ to ensure the conservation, protection, and improved management o f ecological,
social, and economic environment o f the Cooperative Management and Protection
Area, including geological, biological, wildlife, riparian, and scenic resources; and
♦ to promote and foster cooperation, communication, and understanding and to reduce
conflict between Steens Mountain users and interests.
In ranchers’ eyes, the original purpose statement was more fair and balanced. Though the
list o f objectives in the final bill calls attention to and protects important, diverse
activities that occur on the mountain, it is clear that ecological integrity takes priority.
Stacy Davies explained, “I fear that the first time things get a little bit heated and
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somebody takes us to court, the judge is only going to look at the purpose, and that’s
where he’ll stop.” Of course, that scenario is exactly what conservationists want.
Despite wins like the purpose statement, environmentalists do not claim Steens as
a complete and decisive victory. They wanted more wilderness; they wanted all WSAs to
become designated as wilderness. They wanted land above 6,500 feet and the entire
Donner und Blitzen watershed cattle-free. “They have a lot o f good arguments that cows
don’t belong up there. And we took cows off 70,000 new acres, but it’s still cow country.
That’s a big give from their dream,” commented Peter Green. During negotiations,
environmentalists called themselves the Steens-Alvord Coalition; they wanted the Alvord
Desert within the boundary area—the complete preservation o f a basin and range
ecosystem, approximately 1.2 million acres. They didn’t get these things. But they did
get quite a bit.
Some numbers: The Steens Mountain Cooperative Management and Protection
Area consists o f 425,550 acres o f federal land. Approximately 900,000 acres (including
the Alvord Desert) are withdrawn from location, entry, and patent under mining laws and
operation o f mineral leasing, geothermal leasing (one o f the biggest perceived threats on
the Alvord), and mineral materials laws—except for the development o f minerals, such as
a gravel pit, from existing sources for road maintenance. The act establishes the Steens
-Mountain Wilderness Area, consisting o f 169,465 acres o f federal land (including the
recently acquired 13,833 acres ofprivate land), A N o Livestock Grazing Area o f 97,071
acres (approximately 30,000 acres were previously removed from grazing), lies within
the wilderness boundary (U.S. House 2000a).
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Before the Steens wilderness designation, it had been sixteen years since a
sizeable chunk o f land was set aside as wilderness in Oregon. In 1996, Senator Mark
Hatfield helped protect about 20,000 acres o f one o f the largest remaining old-growth
tracts in the Cascades: the Opal Creek Wilderness and Scenic Area—Oregon’s last
congressionally designated wilderness. But it was tiny in comparison to wilderness
designations o f the past. More than a million acres throughout Oregon were preserved
when the Wilderness Act was passed in 1964 and more than 800,000 acres were
protected in 1984 legislation (Cole 2000a). Steens Mountain brought that long, dry spell
to an end.
New Wild and Scenic designations include the following: Kiger Creek (4.25
miles); Wildhorse Creek (7 miles); and Little Wildhorse Creek (2.6 miles); and new
segments o f the Donner und Blitzen Wild and Scenic River including Ankle Creek (8.1
miles); South Fork o f Ankle Creek (1.6 miles), and Mud Creek (5.10 miles). The new
designations bring a total o f 103.65 miles o f Wild and Scenic River to the CMPA (U.S.
House 2000a).
A Donner und Blitzen Redband Trout Preserve was created along the Donner und
Blitzen River and the adjacent riparian areas on federal land within the wilderness area,
above its confluence with Fish Creek. This preserve was created to protect, conserve,
and enhance the habitat o f this endemic fish and its habitat and provide an area for
research, education, and fish and wildlife-oriented recreation (U.S. House 2000a).
The use o f motorized or mechanical vehicles on federal land is prohibited off-road
(though defining a road may become a sticky issue, which will be settled within the
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management plan), and no new roads will be constructed with the exception o f roads
dedicated to public safety and environmental protection.
Other elements o f the bill fall in grayer realms. The Steens Mountain Advisory
Committee (SMAC) is seen by some as deference to local control, or at the very least,
local influence. Still, environmentalists and conservationists hold prominent places on
the committee. Like BLM Resource Advisory Councils, the SMAC will be purely
advisory; however, David Blackstun explains that the BLM will take that advice very
seriously. “It potentially could be at our own peril to reject their advice,” he speculated.
“There’s some hope that the SMAC, with its diverse participation, will lead us through
some o f those minefields that might result if they weren’t involved.” The first task o f the
SMAC will be to help the BLM develop the management plan—a contentious and
challenging task indeed. Consider the make-up o f its members, who will be nominated
by various decision-makers and appointed by the Secretary o f the Interior:
> one private landowner in the CMPA, nominated by Harney County Court;
> two persons who are federal grazing permittees on federal lands in the CMPA,
nominated by Harney Co. Court;
> a person interested in fish and recreational fishing in the CMPA, nominated by the
Governor;
> a member o f Bums Paiute Tribe, nominated by the tribe;
> two persons who are recognized environmental representatives, one will represent the
state as a whole and one the local area, both nominated by the Governor;
> a person who participates in dispersed recreation (hiking, camping, nature viewing,
horseback riding, etc), nominated by the Oregon State Director o f the BLM;
> a person who is a recreational permit holder or is a representative o f a commercial
recreation operation in the CMPA, nominated by the Oregon State Director o f the
BLM and Hamey Co. Court;
> a person who participates in mechanized or consumptive recreation (hunting, fishing,
off-road driving, hang gliding, etc), nominated by the Oregon State Director o f the
BLM;
> a person with expertise and interest in wild horse management, nominated by the
Oregon State Director o f the BLM;
> a person who has no financial interest in the CMPA to represent statewide interests,
nominated by the Governor.
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In reviewing the nominees, the Secretary is expected to consult with the community that
the nominees are to represent to ensure that the nominees have support (U.S. House
2000a). Before the legislation had even passed the Senate, people had contacted the
BLM and Governor’s office, expressing interest in serving on the SMAC.
Development is another wait-and-see issue at Steens—much will be defined,
refined, and decided in the management plan. The Governor’s office spearheaded the
development issue during the shaping o f the legislation, though environmentalists had
always been vehement in pointing out threats to the mountain and the need for its
protection.
In 1997, for example, John and Cindy Witzel applied for a permit to build a lodge
for their pack business on their 160 acres o f land on Lake Creek—a tributary o f the wild
and scenic Fish Creek. They use the land as a base camp for their pack business and each
season set up a temporary camp, with walls, tents, and platforms. The proposed lodge
was a dramatic change from the previous use o f their land; it included fifteen permanent
guest cabins, a restaurant, and gift shop. Since the land was zoned “exclusive form use,”
the county turned them down. But in 2000, the Witzels reapplied, this time calling their
facility a school—citing the educational components o f some o f their tours—after they
discovered schools are permitted in “exclusive farm use” zoning. They even received a
license from the Oregon Department o f Education to construct it. Environmentalists
called it a “thinly veiled” proposal and warned o f a massive development in the high
Steens that would ruin the remote and pristine nature o f the area. This issue remained
unresolved when the Steens legislation passed. Recently, the Witzels lost their case in
front o f the state Land Use Board o f Appeals and have petitioned the Oregon State
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Supreme Court. But Bill Marlett doesn't expect the court to hear their case. “Since then,”
he adds, “they have applied to build a house up on Steens, which they will in turn use to
apply as a guest lodge under a special guest ranch law in Oregon. . . We'll see them in
court again.”
I asked Peter Green if there were any other proposals besides the Witzels’ school
that led the Governor’s office to believe that development was a major threat at Steens.
“It’s not that far from California,” he said. “There’s 35 million Californians down there;
it’s the perfect summer location. Land in that county zoning allows you to sell 160 acre
parcels under current law without going to the county court for permission.” Green felt
that landowners on Steens had essentially two options to make money from their land:
graze or develop it. Taking away development would eliminate one o f those options.
And so the Governor’s office embraced the position o f “better grazing, no development.”
Kevin Smith followed up: “I’ll just start out by saying that we didn’t get
everything we wanted on development. There are some real precedent-setting things we
wanted to have. For instance, right o f first refusal—if someone on the mountain is going
to sell their property beyond their immediate family, we wanted the federal government
to have the opportunity to purchase that land. And we were told that, politically, that
would never get through Congress. The property rights—how should I say this—the
property rights people across the country would never let this happen.”
As it is written in the act, any development “which is different from the current
character and uses o f the land is inconsistent with the purposes o f this Act” (U.S. House
2000a). But what that means on the ground is a bit unclear. Green explained that a
private landowner could put a bam or fence on his property, but he wouldn’t be allowed
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to build a Minute Mart on the loop road or a condominium development. “It gets grayer
if you want to build a hunting cabin on your little piece o f land and hide it down in an
aspen grove so nobody can see it,” he said. “We’d like that not to happen, but that’s a
very gray area.”
Andy Kerr, Bill Marlett, and even the BLM’s Miles Brown believe the law has no
teeth, though it does provide incentives. The act authorizes the use o f $25,000,000 from
the Land and Water Conservation Fund to fund future acquisitions within the boundaries
o f the CMPA by voluntary exchanges, donation, or purchase from willing sellers. While
most ranchers and landowners support and prefer an incentive-based means to keeping
the mountain free from development, others continue to worry about whether such
incentives will be enough.
Hidden behind the high-profile controversies o f development, wilderness, and
boundary lines is an area where ranchers and environmentalists were able to find
common, solid ground. The act creates a 3,267-acre Wildland Juniper Management
Area, It was created for the purposes o f experimentation, education, interpretation, and
demonstration o f management techniques for restoration o f the historic fire regime and
native vegetation communities (U.S. House 2000a). It is commonly agreed—by the
BLM, ranchers, and environmentalists—that western juniper, a native species, on the
mountain has reached unnatural levels, seriously affecting the proper functioning and
ecology o f watersheds, plant distribution, and soils. On Steens* the tree is choking out
aspen groves and other grass and plants, which provide forage for both cattle and
wildlife.
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According to Andy Kerr, conservationists believe the species has spread because
o f the exclusion o f fire and the introduction o f livestock. “The ranchers tend to agree
with the problem but not the cause,” he explained. “Conservationists were in a position
where we needed to make sure that jumper management would be addressed fairly,
creatively, and wisely, or we would have trouble designating additional wilderness
areas.” Though the two sides did not agree on the motives or means o f controlling the
species, there was general agreement for the need to address—through active
management—the problem o f encroaching western juniper trees. Consequently, the bill
sets up a demonstration area in order to test various management techniques and their
effects: prescribed fire, chainsaws, handsaws, even “backpack-mounted flame-throwers
on snowshoed fire technicians,” as suggested by Kerr. ‘Tor the record, I’d be glad to
volunteer for such a mission,” he revealed in testimony to the House subcommittee.
The juniper demonstration area is a released Wilderness Study Area—the only
one on the mountain. “It [the demonstration area] was originally in our very first bill.
Then they said we could not release any wilderness study areas, period,” explained Stacy
Davies. But the piece o f ground they wanted to use was at the perfect place—right on the
North Loop road, where anyone can see it. And it represents a classic scenario o f juniper
encroachment, with crowded, dying aspen clones and little ground cover. During the
final, core negotiations, Marlett and Kerr brought the demonstration area back into the
bill. “It’ll really work,” said Davies, smiling. “We can demonstrate how to manage
juniper by different methods. And the general public w ill begin to understand why
juniper is an issue that needs to be dealt with.”
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Such partnerships, cooperation, and common goals may have an opportunity to
grow from this legislation. Compromise might yield innovation instead of
disappointment. Envision Andy Kerr with a flame-thrower and Fred Otley with a
chainsaw—facing, not each other, but a juniper tree.
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X
Hammer Over the Table:
A Model?

Two questions arise when considering the Steens story: is the special management
area actually better than a national monument and can the process be replicated—is it a
model? Environmentalists started out by calling for a monument; at the time, they felt it
was the best, quickest, and most viable option for protecting the mountain. But, as
negotiations evolved, they discovered that legislation might just be a better option. They
embraced and defended it in the end. Why? Wilderness might be the number one reason.
The very fist cattle-free wilderness to be precise. Ranchers never wanted a monument;
time and time again they spoke o f how it would ruin the remote character o f the region,
the cooperative partnerships already formed, the management o f the landscape. But, to
some, passing the legislation was only a matter o f capturing the lesser o f two evils. They
would have preferred things to be left as they were.
Agency staff played an important role during the negotiations by their presence at
meetings, knowledge o f resource values, and ability to quickly produce map after map
through GIS technology—providing a tangible portrayal o f how boundaries and
management schemes might change with different alternatives. They had many reasons
to encourage the legislation. Miles Brown suggested that the agency was heading
towards gridlock on Steens; anything the BLM did on the mountain was going to end up
in a lawsuit or appeal. “We were much more in favor o f legislation than a monument,”
he said, “because legislation had the opportunity to resolve a lot o f the issues and make a
lot o f calls. The more direction provided to us, the better. That’s a bureaucrat’s dream.
Don’t leave it open-ended. Maybe in the past that was all right, but in today’s world,
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with the resource issues we have on this mountain, the tighter the direction the better.” I
asked him if the consolidation o f public land, o f wilderness, at the top o f the mountain
would make management easier. “I don’t think it’s going to be easier,” he paused and
then slowly grinned. “I think it’s going to be a whole new world.”
Politicians savored the opportunity to'come up with an “Oregon solution,” and
soon touted it as such. A monument, according to Kevin Smith, could have put Steens on
the “national travel industry radar scope” and ruined its special, remote character.
Additionally, a monument might not be bullet proof as political power shifted over the
years. “Who knows what’s going to happen to monuments in the future? Congress can
deny money for implementation. There’s avenues for Congress to play havoc with
national monuments that were designated by a president not o f the party,” Smith
pondered. Even Stacy Davies noted that there was a chance that George W. Bush or a
future president could overturn Clinton’s many monuments. The bipartisan legislation,
on the other hand, would be much more difficult to change. Would the ranchers at Steens
have been “safer in the basket with the others?” O f course, Peter Green and Kevin Smith
did not speculate on that aspect o f the designation. They had helped craft an Oregon
solution, and they were satisfied with its resiliency.
“How do you think this is better than a national monument, for Oregon,” I asked
Green and Smith.
“Go ahead,” Green said to Smith and then looked back at me. “We have a long
list.”
“I think we got more land protected. We protected the local character and
economy o f the area,” explained Smith.
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“We had some anti-development language in there which we wouldn’t have had
at all,” added Green.
“I think a future benefit o f this, frankly, is just a political one,” Smith continued.
“The Oregon delegation and the governor have now found that with a lot o f hard work
they can actually accomplish this kind o f feat. This was no small feat in Oregon history.”
“Would you call it precedent setting?” I asked.
“Absolutely,” answered Smith without hesitation.
“Oh yeah, for ways to protect the West,” said Green.
“Not only from an Oregon perspective and the delegation o f the Oregon political
community, but I think, nationally, both sides are already making noises that this is a
model that ought to be pursued,” Smith asserted.
Democratic Representative Peter DeFazio echoed Smith’s sentiment: “I believe
this sets a precedent that will be replicated time and time again to protect other
extraordinary places, not only in my home state o f Oregon but throughout the western
United States” (Cole 2000a).
Democratic Senator Ron Wyden called the Steens bill “the biggest win for
Oregon in years,” and said he would pursue a similar approach on the Oregon coast,
within the Siskiyou National Forest. “I’m going to spend a lot o f time talking to the
community about it,” Wyden said. “And the first question will be: Is there a Steens
solution?” (Cole 2000a).
Republicans were not lacking in praise either.
“Well, all I can say is that I’m hearing people tell me—I heard it yesterday—that
this is going to be a model for how to solve conflicts down the road,” said Lindsay Slater.
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“It’s a good model,” he added, especially since it recognizes that landowners are losing
value in federal permits. “We did a good job o f compensating them for losses and
reallocations. With all the pressure that are being brought to bear on ranchers and
resource users, w e’re going to have to come up with these novel solutions to make things
work.”
‘I ’m just thrilled,” said Oregon Republican Senator Gordon Smith to an
Oregonian reporter. “This is such a wonderful example for the whole country o f the way
to protect the environment without rolling the stakeholders” (Cole 2000b).
O f course, Steens is a wonderful example o f an “Oregon solution.” As Andy Kerr
explained, there may be more “deals” like this in the future—deals in which each
constituency gains something, deals that are not a “zero sum game.” “It’s such a deal we
hope to replicate,” he said. But Kerr and other environmentalists warn against calling
Steens a “model,” especially a model o f collaboration. They prefer the term negotiation,
the idea of “cutting a deal,” and stress that without Babbitt’s threat, without that hammer
over the table, ranchers would never have negotiated. The fear o f a national monument
was the only impetus for them to sit down at the table. Bill Marlett claims he met with
Representative Walden a year earlier, and the congressman essentially blew him off,
stating there was too much wilderness, too many lock-ups in eastern Oregon already.
“All this shows is that people can come together when they’re forced to. This would
have never happened by their free w ill. . . The bottom line is, and Fred and Stacy have
said this, they were choosing the lesser o f two evils. And if they had their way, they
would have just let things be. You don’t need a solution for a problem that doesn’t
exist.”
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But it’s wrong to assume that collaboration happens just because people
graciously decide to collaborate. Collaboration does not have to voluntary, unprovoked,
or without a mandate. It is not always a harmonious gathering o f diverse interests sitting
around a table, holding hands, working through their differences, and coming up with
born-again solutions. In feet, more often than not, collaboration occurs because o f an
outside threat or pressure. Literature on the subject is replete with examples of
collaboration happening because o f an unambiguous threat or even an opportunity. In
Napa, California, a citizen coalition came up with a plan to restore and revitalize the
Napa River—and got the Army Corps o f Engineers to cooperate— under a threat o f the
loss o f a $78 million federal appropriation, approved thirty years earlier (Krist 2000). In
Montana, the Northern Lights Institute Clark Fork Project occurred because o f a threat of
a contested water reservation, a case in which there would be a clear winner and a clear
loser. Collaboration would not have occurred without this legal hammer over the table
(Snow 2001). The list goes on.
Jonathan Lange writes that collaboration, often considered a voluntary process,
actually displays many paradoxes, including what he calls the “entry paradox”:
It is surprisingly difficult to find instances o f an unpressured use
o f the process. Few disputants enter mediation by spontaneous mutual
choice. Instead, most instances involve reluctant parties entering the
process either under strong social pressure; under pressure mobilized by
the other disputant; or because they are required to do so by a government
agency (Lange 2000).
He points to the example o f the Applegate Partnership in Oregon, where one
environmental representative said he was there “to keep an eye on things” and make sure
nothing would happen to hurt the cause; and a timber industry representative explained
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that he was pressured to participate because he felt there was “a gun to my head and to
the head o f the whole industry” (Lange 2001).
Utah’s San Rafael Swell serves as a counterpoint to Steens. Here, there was no
“sword o f Damocles” hanging over the collaboration table. Residents of Emery County
had been working with federal land managers since 1995 to develop a plan to improve
management o f the swell area, an increasing popular place to camp, hike, and ride offroad vehicles. It also contains large areas o f pristine land that conservationists want
protected as wilderness. Republican Representative Chris Cannon drafted a bill the set
goals for a proposed NCA in 1998, but it was killed by Democrats. Talks began again in
2000, and when local officials reached a compromise, many felt the bill would pass
Congress since it had the support o f both the White House and Utah’s Republican
leaders. Environmentalists managed to kill it, stating they were never invited to
negotiate. Republicans said they never would have compromised anyway. Each side
blamed the other. Some pointed out that the right dynamic just wasn’t there. After
President Clinton’s surprise declaration o f Grand Staircase-Escalante National Monument
in 1996, Interior Secretary Bruce Babbitt promised there would be no more monuments
in Utah. No threat o f a monument meant there was no rush to find common ground at
San Rafael Swell (W oolf2000).
There were a few other places, besides Steens, where that dynamic was present.
In Colorado, Representative Scott Mclnnis called together all stakeholders in order to
develop a proposal that would offset a national monument proclamation for an area south
and west o f Grand Junction. The result was the 123,000-acre Colorado Canyons National
Conservation Area, which includes 75,000 acres o f formally designated wilderness
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(W oolf2000). After the Interior Secretary visited the Cienega Creek area in southern
Arizona, Republican Representative Jim Kolbe and Senator John McCain sponsored a
locally developed bill (which included the participation o f a regional environmental
group) that became the 48,000-acre Las Cienegas National Conservation Area. Congress
also passed protection for 272,000 acres in the Santa Rosa Mountains o f so utheastern
California, championed by Republican Representative Mary Bono (Nijhuis and Brooks

2000).
“Without Bruce Babbitt’s challenge to the governor and the delegation to find a
new way beyond a national monument to protect this most precious place, I think it
would be very difficult to achieve the kind o f consensus that we did achieve,” said Kevin
Smith. Given this fact, it might seem unlikely that the process at Steens can be used as a
cut-and-dried model. Unless, o f course, another powerful government official decides to
provide that first spark and initiate negotiations. “That’s what is unique about this
process,” said Bill Marlett in reference the mantle o f Babbitt ’s threat. “It almost makes it
not worth talking about, because unless you can replicate that dynamic, you’re not going
to get these kind o f discussions going. And I could be proved wrong, may be proved
wrong.”
But I couldn’t completely agree with Marlett. What if you set that context aside
for a moment and focus upon another? What if you considered a context in which
ranchers can perceive benefits in legislation that results in wilderness, and
environmentalists can see value in legislation that might result in land exchanges or
economic adjustments? The Steens process might not be a model, but certainly it has
broken ground for the development of a new model for solving natural resource conflicts
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and protecting land. Bipartisan cooperation is possible. Ranchers and environmentalists
can transcend some differences. And people, no matter how staunch and stubborn they
may seem, should not be excluded from the table for that reason alone. In this context, it
might not matter that people were forced to come to the table.
In another context, it is important to realize that pressures were coming to bear on
the ranchers at Steens Mountain, even without the threat o f a monument. Undoubtedly,
Babbitt’s sword was the sharpest point, the quickest means o f cutting through a polarized
situation and getting people to cooperate. But in a world o f increasingly competing
demands on natural resources—whether it be recreation or open space or wilderness
preservation or extraction—hammers will be lifted, swords drawn, and threats uttered.
The effect o f transition in the West—both economic and demographic— so visible in the
example o f Steens, is the silver spur prodding the horse o f innovation. People may begin
to perceive, by looking back upon examples like Steens, that coming together around the
table and discovering innovative solutions might be the best way to protect what is dear
to them. And they might find this protection will last a bit longer than a change in
administration or a court ruling.
‘T’m o f the opinion that we had to have some sort o f hammer out there for this to
happen,” explained Peter Green. “Of course, the hammer had to be in the right hands too.
And when you consider that we have the weakest delegation in the entire Congress as far
as total years o f seniority. And it’s a year when Congress can’t get anything done at all.
It’s an election year, and everything was stacked against us. And yet we pulled this off
because everybody pulled together. So, getting back to your question—well, half o f them
came together because o f the hammer. But the hammer didn’t make the legislation. It’s
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the people coming together that made the legislation.” People who were willing to
innovate. People who were willing to accommodate change. People, like Fred Otley and
Stacy Davies, who have a sense o f what is happening in the West and were smart enough
to bend without breaking—to figure out how to hold onto some o f their tradition by
pursuing untested solutions and seeking new ground. People, like Andy Kerr and Bill
Marlett, who were smart enough to work strategically with the “other side”—to realize a
unique opportunity had arrived that might not come around again. All o f the people who
worked to find a solution as Steens—Republicans and Democrats, locals and nationals,
conservationists and ranchers, politicians and agency staff—did so because o f different
motivations. But, in the end, they did so as a sort o f strange coalition fighting for a
solution—a solution they had crafted together. That may be the key to understanding
why the Steens Mountain legislation passed.

O f course, I cannot say all the reasons why people came together to negotiate the
fate o f Steens Mountain. Since I was not there, the negotiations are only a story I can tell
second-hand. But, as I learned over the course o f several visits, the mountain will
quickly give you stories o f your own. Anyone who gathers stories from a place may
learn to love it. My own visits to Steens and the land it presides over have inscribed
within me indelible memories— separate moments that gather and flow together like
mountain creeks filling a desert basin. I watch a band o f wild horses, mostly paints,
grazing near the highway. Their heads are bent to earth. Their tails are blown by high
desert winds. The bright-colored markings on their bodies cast patterns against the sage
and juniper hills, as the mountain spills shadows on the desert floor. I walk though a long
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canyon, carved by some glacier long ago. I follow the Little Blitzen, which stalls in clear
pools and is graced by the silver half-moons o f redband trout. The clear water is littered
with boulders and golden coins o f aspen and cottonwood leaves. The sweet, punchy
smell o f juniper wood smoke lingers on my clothes and skin. I watch with curiosity and
fear as Stacy Davies stands in shit and blood and afterbirth as he struggles to pull a
newborn calf from an exhausted heifer, who has fallen to her knees. Once arrived, the
creature struggles for breath, blowing clear bubbles from his large nostrils as he sheds the
film o f his previous world. On the refuge, I lock eyes with a tawny coyote standing on
the opposite bank of the Donner und Blitzen. After several timeless moments, he breaks
our gaze and casually walks away. I laugh as Fred Otley’s cattle dog tries to herd me
back to the house and, later, pulls at my boot strings while Otley cracks me another frothy
beer. I arise to coffee and an egg Dutch baby, light as air and lathered in syrup, prepared
by Alice Elshoff for my last day at the refuge. As I leave, she hugs me goodbye and says
it feels like she’s sending off one of her children.
Wendell Berry writes, “Harmony is one phase, the good phase, o f the inescapable
dialogue between culture and nature. In this phase, humans consciously and
conscientiously ask o f their work: Is this good for us? Is this good for our place?” Steens
Mountain is big enough to foster many different kinds o f loves, many memories. That
does not mean it has never suffered abuse or greed. Yet when I think about all the
different people who came together because o f a solitary mountain in the Oregon desert, I
cannot help but wonder if all o f their loves, fears, and ambitions blended in a harmony,
somehow both lyrical and discordant, particular to Steens. I wonder if others will hear it.
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